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THE CONTINUING THRESHOLD TEST
FOR FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
Andy G. Olree*
ABSTRACT
When a claimant challenges some governmental law or action under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, courts have long required the claimant to
make out a prima facie case that the government has burdened the exercise of the
claimant's sincerely held religious beliefs. This requirement has been referred to as
the threshold test for free exercise claims, since claimants must make this showing
as a threshold matter before courts will proceed to evaluate the burden and the gov-
ernmental interest at stake under some standard of scrutiny. This Article argues that
although the Supreme Court of the United States has recently adopted a more defer-
ential standard of scrutiny for many types of free exercise claims, the Court has never
signaled dissatisfaction with the threshold test itself, and indeed could not abandon
the test without being unfaithful to the text of the Free Exercise Clause. Moreover,
this Article proposes that the Court's most recent free exercise case, Locke v. Davey,
can be understood as a rejection of the claimant's challenge for failure to satisfy the
threshold test. So understood, Davey signals little change in free exercise law and poses
no new obstacle to claimants in future free exercise challenges involving governmental
funding programs of various sorts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court of the United States has weak-
ened the First Amendment's ban on laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
The major turning point was the Supreme Court's opinion in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.' In Smith the Court announced
that, by and large, it would uphold laws that impose burdens on the exercise of religious
beliefs, no matter how severe those burdens are, as long as the laws do not single out
some religious belief or practice for uniquely unfavorable treatment.2 Although the
Court had previously announced that even generally applicable laws could be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and struck down,3 the Court now seemed to read the Free
Exercise Clause as prohibiting little more than dejure discrimination against religion,
the sort of facially discriminatory governmental action that might well be forbidden
in any event by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 Id. at 877-79. In dicta the Court suggested there might be narrow exceptions to this
general rule. First, the Court suggested that government regulations might warrant more judicial
skepticism in so-called "hybrid situations," cases involving the violation of some other consti-
tutional right in addition to the free exercise right. Id. at 881-82. Second, the Court suggested
that strict scrutiny might still be warranted when the challenged regulation involves the dis-
tribution of unemployment benefits-or, possibly, some other similar governmental program
in which individualized exemptions are granted but the government has refused to extend an
exemption in cases of religious hardship. Id. at 883-85. Lower courts have sometimes ignored
the dictum regarding hybrid situations as irreconcilable with the central holding of the case
and have declined to follow it. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d
Cir. 2003) (rejecting Smith dictum regarding hybrid situations); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of
the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
3 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215,220-21,233-36 (1972); see also Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,603-.04 (1983) (upholding a generally applicable tax law
against a free exercise challenge, on the ground that the law satisfied strict scrutiny).
4 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that when a law is "facially neutral and uniformly applicable," requiring
the federal government to show only that the law constitutes a "reasonable means of promoting
a legitimate public interest" would impose a level of scrutiny for free exercise claims "that the
Equal Protection Clause already provides"); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,273 (1951)
(holding that when a city required a permit to be obtained in advance by groups who wished
to speak or assemble in public park, and the city had previously granted such permits to various
religious groups, "the completely arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant the permits [to
Jehovah's Witnesses] was a denial of equal protection"); see also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that a facially discriminatory law excluding females from public
university violated the Equal Protection Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
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Still, there remained a pair of longstanding free exercise doctrines that the Smith
decision did not call into question. First, claimants who wish to challenge government
action under the Free Exercise Clause must satisfy a threshold test: they must show
that the government action imposed a burden on the exercise of their sincerely held
religious beliefs.5 Second, when the claimant satisfies the threshold test and further
shows that the government engaged in intentional discrimination along religious lines,
courts must apply strict scrutiny to the government action.6 The majority opinion in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, decided three years after Smith,
affirmed both of these understandings.7
However, several commentators have suggested that the second of these doctrines
has now been weakened, at least in some contexts, by the Court's most recent Free
Exercise Clause case, Locke v. Davey.8 In Davey, the Court upheld a state program
granting scholarship funding for certain students to attend public or private universities
in the state, but denying such funding if the recipient declared an intent to obtain a
degree in a field that his school designated as "theology."9 Because the ideas studied
in the field of "theology" are by definition religious ones, and because theology was
the only degree field forbidden to scholarship recipients, some commentators saw the
state scholarship program as an intentional and facial discrimination against religion
(holding that a facially discriminatory law disallowing protected status and discrimination
claims due to the claimant's homosexual or bisexual orientation violated the Equal Protection
Clause); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that a
facially discriminatory zoning law requiring facilities serving the mentally retarded to obtain
a special operating permit violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S.
216 (1984) (holding that a facially discriminatory law forbidding aliens to become notaries
public violated Equal Protection Clause); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (holding that a facially discriminatory law excluding males from a public school of
nursing violated the Equal Protection Clause); Strauderv. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(holding that a facially discriminatory law excluding non-whites from juries violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
' See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531-32
(1993); Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Hemandez v. Comm'r,
490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
448-53 (1988); Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-701; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-16, 218; Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04, 406-07 (1963); see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933,953 (1989)
(noting the threshold requirement in Free Exercise Clause cases and dividing the requirement
into three separate elements which together set forth a prima facie case).
6 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78, 886 n.3; id. at 894-95
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699;
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406-07.
7 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (applying the threshold test); id. at 531-33 (finding that an
ordinance must satisfy strict scrutiny because it was intended to prohibit only those animal
killings done with religious motives).
8 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
9 Id. at 715-17.
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by the government, leading those commentators to question whether the Court was
faithfully applying Smith and Lukumi as it upheld the program.'" Justice Scalia, who
authored the majority opinion in Smith, made the same point in his dissent in Davey."
Some have further suggested that Davey announces a new, deferential stance toward
government funding programs that exclude the religious.'2 In any case, the Davey
majority did not clearly apply strict scrutiny to the state scholarship program, 3 so if
the program was indeed facially discriminatory against religion, it may seem at first
blush that Davey weakened free exercise rights again, announcing yet another set of
circumstances under which strict scrutiny will not be applied to free exercise claims.
Yet Davey need not be read so as to further restrict religious liberty. In fact,
Davey can reasonably be read as working no significant change in free exercise law
and setting forth no less rigorous free exercise analysis for the realm of government
funding decisions. The key to this interpretation is the recognition that there con-
tinues to be a threshold test for free exercise claims, requiring claimants to make a
prima facie showing that the government has burdened the exercise of their sincere
religious beliefs. While Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Davey could
have been clearer on this point, the outcome can be understood as grounded in the
Court's conclusion that the claimant could not satisfy that threshold test.'
4
In this Article, I argue that, while Smith regrettably weakened free exercise rights,
it did not weaken or abolish the threshold test for free exercise claims. I further argue
that reasonable judicial enforcement of this test is useful and proper and, in itself, will
not defeat the valid claims of sincere religious practitioners. I argue that Davey is best
understood, not as a new barrier to certain sorts of religious liberty claims, but merely
as a reaffirmation of the threshold test. In other words, the Davey outcome was dic-
tated by the failure of the particular claimant in that case to show that the state had
o See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and
the Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L.
REv. 227, 231-36 (2004); Susanna Dokupil, Function Follows Form: Locke v. Davey's
Unnecessary Parsing, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 327, 339-41 (2004); Richard F. Duncan,
Locked Out: Locke v. Davey and the Broken Promise of Equal Access, 8 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 699, 704-05,707-08 (2006); Comment, Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The
Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty,
118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 171-73 (2004); F. Philip Manns, Jr., Finding the "Free Play" Between
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 71 TENN. L. REV. 657,657-58,693 (2004). But
see Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 323, 331-33 (2004) ("A
contrary ruling [in Davey] would have dramatically changed the law... [by requiring] that
any time the government provides assistance to private secular entities it would be required
to give the same aid to religious institutions.").
" Davey, 540 U.S. at 726-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 See, e.g., Dokupil, supra note 10, at 354; Laycock, supra note 10, at 171-74; Manns,
supra note 10, at 664.
,3 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "the [majority's] opinion
is devoid of any mention of standard of review").
,4 See infra Part lI.C.
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burdened any practice motivated by his own sincere religious beliefs. Thus the opinion
ought to have little impact on most future Free Exercise Clause cases, whether in-
volving scholarships, vouchers, fines, or any other government action. Davey should
not affect future free exercise claims as long as the religious claimant can show that
the government impediment-whether it takes the form of a punishment or a denial
of a generally available benefit-imposed a burden on the claimant's exercise of her
sincerely held religious beliefs.
In Part I, I trace the development of the threshold test from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to the Smith decision. In Part 11, 1 show that Smith and Lukumi did not question
or weaken the threshold test. In Part Im, I discuss Locke v. Davey, arguing that the
opinion is best understood as an application of the threshold test, rooted in the Court's
finding that the plaintiff had not shown a governmental burden on the exercise of
his sincere religious beliefs. In Part IV, I argue that the threshold test as compelled
by precedent constitutes a useful and proper understanding of the free exercise right.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THRESHOLD TEST
A. Nature of the Test
The threshold test for free exercise claims is simply a requirement that the claimant
make out a prima facie case that the state has violated her rights under the Free Exercise
Clause."5 In other words, the claimant must show that the state has burdened her sin-
cerely held religious beliefs. 6 The threshold test may be broken into three components:
(1) the state must have imposed a burden on the claimant's belief; (2) the claimant's
belief must be sincerely held; and (3) the claimant's belief must be religious in nature. 7
If the claimant satisfies all three prongs, the court then proceeds to determine whether
the state action passes muster under some standard of review,"8 requiring the state to
enunciate its interest and to show how closely its action is related to that interest. 9
's See Lupu, supra note 5, at 934 (describing the threshold test as the requirement that
claimant make out "a prima facie case of a violation of the [Free Exercise] [C]lause").
16 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716-18 (1981).
" For a discussion of the threshold test and each of its three elements, see Lupu, supra
note 5, at 934, 953-60.
s See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531 (1993)
(considering an ordinance banning animal sacrifice, where petitioners claimed that "animal
sacrifice is an integral part of [petitioners'] religion," and the Court "must consider petitioners'
First Amendment claim" because the city "[did] not argue that Santeria is not a 'religion' within
the meaning of the First Amendment" and raised no question as to "the sincerity of petitioners'
professed desire to conduct animal sacrifices for religious reasons").
19 See, e.g., id. at 546; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas, 450
U.S. at 718; LAURENCE H.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST1TUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1251 (2d
ed. 1988).
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If the claimant cannot satisfy the threshold test, the claim fails before the court ever
applies a standard of review.2°
The Court has sometimes applied parts of the threshold test rather gingerly, but
it has never abandoned the test. Regarding the sincerity prong, for example, the Court
has said that it will not determine the truth or falsehood of the underlying religious
beliefs,2 ' but this cannot fairly be equated with a refusal to judge the claimant's sin-
cerity. The test has never required claimants to prove their religious beliefs are true,
only that they are religious in nature and sincerely held.22 Similarly, the Court has said
that judges should not "question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to
a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of [a particular denomi-
nation's] creeds, 23 but the Court was hardly asserting that judges should be apa-
thetic about whether the beliefs espoused by the claimant in litigation are actually
the claimant's own religious beliefs. The most that can be said is that the Court has
sometimes suggested some degree of deference to the assertions of the claimant about
such matters.24 But the Court has consistently maintained that some judicial scru-
tiny of these assertions is nevertheless required, for laws cannot effectively bind if
judges are willing to grant exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause to those whose
asserted motives are insincere or nonreligious. 25 The same can be said for the Court's
treatment of the burden requirement: while expressing some reluctance to quantify
the degree of "burden" which must be shown by claimants in order to state a cogni-
zable claim,26 the Court has never completely abandoned the burden requirement, and
has sometimes gone so far as to hold that even laws "interfer[ing] significantly with
private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment" are not sufficiently burden-
some to trigger free exercise scrutiny if they have not "coerced" private persons "into
violating their religious beliefs. 27 In sum, the Court has never suggested that a free
exercise claimant could prevail without making a prima facie showing of a burden on
sincerely held religious beliefs.
20 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,448-53 (1988);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986).
21 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990); Lee, 455 U.S. at
257; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82, 85-88 (1944).
22 See Lupu, supra note 5, at 934, 953-60.
23 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
24 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (holding that a claimant's contention about his religious belief
cannot be challenged on the ground that it does not comport with the government's interpre-
tation of the Amish faith); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-14 (defining the meaning of "religious").
2 See, e.g., Frazee v. U1. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829,833 (1989) (explaining
that the Free Exercise Clause only protects religious, not secular, beliefs, and while tasks of
defining "religious" and determining sincerity are difficult, courts can and do make such deter-
minations); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 ("The narrow function of a reviewing court in this
context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.").
26 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 n.4.
27 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
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Broadly speaking, there are two ways by which a state might burden a claimant's
religious belief: by penalizing the claimant for believing something, or by penalizing
the claimant for doing some act motivated by the belief. In its early free exercise cases,
the Court seemed to allow the government to forbid virtually any act as long as beliefs
themselves were not directly forbidden. 8 But for over fifty years, the Court has found
other places to draw the line, extending the protections of the Free Exercise Clause
to encompass some religiously motivated actions as well as beliefs.29 This makes a
good bit of sense textually; the Clause, after all, does not speak of laws "prohibiting
the freedom of religious belief' but laws "prohibiting the free exercise' 30 of religion,
suggesting a right to act as well as believe. Unsurprisingly, most laws alleged to vio-
late free exercise rights have burdened an action and not a belief as such.
This expansion of the Court's free exercise doctrine, providing protection for
religiously motivated acts as well as beliefs, means that in practice, the threshold test
requires the claimant to show that the state, by burdening an act, has burdened her
exercise of her sincere religious beliefs." The burden prong requires the claimant to
show that the state has imposed a burden on the performance of some act the claimant
believes she ought to perform, while the other two prongs require that her belief be
religious and sincerely held.32
B. Evolution of the Test in Supreme Court Case Law
The Court's modem free exercise jurisprudence is only about seventy years old.33
The threshold test for free exercise claims evolved during this period, although some-
thing like it was probably assumed as a requirement in earlier free exercise cases as
well. Of course, the Court has discussed the test more explicitly in some cases than
in others. Moreover, in many cases where the claimant could satisfy the threshold
test, the Court nevertheless upheld the governmental action on other grounds. But
it is still fair to say that in every free exercise case decided by the Supreme Court in
28 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-67 (1879);Lupu, supra note 5, at 937-42.
29 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,532-33 (1993).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
3" See Lupu, supra note 5, at 934, 953-60.
32 ld.
" The first free exercise case to come before the Supreme Court of the United States did
not arise until almost a century after the Court was created. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145. Between
that date and 1940, the Court decided only a handful of free exercise cases, and each was
resolved in favor of the government. See JOHN WrrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTrTrLIONALEXPERIMENT 125 (2d ed. 2005). In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940), however, the Court announced that the free exercise right was incorporated into the
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and was applicable to the states. In this
case and others to follow, the Court began to strike down various state and federal government
actions as violations of free exercise rights. For these reasons, Cantwell is often treated as the
beginning of modem free exercise law.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
which the claimant prevailed against the government, the claimant seems to have been
able to satisfy the threshold test as we know it today. In the earlier cases the Court
discussed the threshold test less and usually did not base a decision on it; in later
cases, however, the Court discussed the test much more explicitly and dismissed
claims that did not satisfy the test.
1. Early Development: Claimants Who Met the Threshold Test, and a Few Who
May Not Have
The Court decided a great many free exercise cases in the middle part of the
twentieth century, few of which presented any serious question whether the govern-
ment had burdened the exercise of sincere religious beliefs. Instead, the arguments
usually centered on whether the burden was justifiable in light of the government
interests at stake. From time to time, however, the Court did discuss various prongs
of the threshold test, and in the process the test evolved into a fixture of standard free
exercise analysis.
This line of cases began with Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Court con-
sidered a state statute requiring solicitors for "religious, charitable, or philanthropic"
causes to obtain a license in advance, and allowing a government official discretion-
ary authority to grant or deny each license case by case based on his determination
of whether the cause was a "religious one or [was] a bona fide object of charity or
philanthropy."34 After holding that the free exercise of religion was a right incorpo-
rated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the
states,35 the Court struck down the statute, finding that it allowed a government official
discretionarily to impose a prior restraint on speech and religious exercises by groups
espousing doctrines with which the official disagreed.36 In Cantwell the Court did
not doubt that the statute imposed a burden on the exercise of the solicitors' sincere
religious beliefs; neither the state nor the Court questioned the facts that the solicitors
were Jehovah's Witnesses who sincerely believed as a religious matter that they must
solicit, and that the state was impeding their solicitation when it arrested them for
failure to obtain a license.37 While it could be argued that their religion did not forbid
them from applying for a license in advance, which was all the law required, this
objection ignores an aspect of the law which the Court found to be crucial. The
Court was troubled by the possibility that, under the law, a state official could deny
the Witnesses a license if he personally did not want them to solicit or did not con-
sider their faith to constitute a "religion."38 Seen from this angle, the state law did not
merely prohibit the act of soliciting without applying in advance for a license; it
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02.
3 Id. at 303.
36 Id. at 305-07.
37 See id. at 300-01, 310.
38 Id. at 305-07.
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prohibited the act of soliciting without the prior written consent of a particular state
official.39 Hence the Witnesses could plausibly claim a burden, in that their religion
required them to do precisely what was forbidden by law: to solicit even if this official
refused to consent.
Another case involving Jehovah's Witnesses might have provided an early oppor-
tunity for the Court to apply the threshold test as a serious screening tool, but the
Court chose not to base its reasoning on that ground. Prince v. Massachusetts in-
volved a mother, Mrs. Prince, who tried to proselytize on downtown street comers
with the occasional aid of her nine-year-old niece, Betty, and two young sons.' Their
activities included handing out magazines and asking for "contributions" from those
who took a copy." The state interpreted this activity to be a sale of goods in public
and charged Mrs. Prince with violating the state' s child labor laws by encouraging
Betty to sell magazines on the streets.42 The Court upheld the laws and the conviction
of Mrs. Prince, notwithstanding her sincere religious motives and those of Betty.43
The majority opinion was rooted in recognition of the state's overwhelming interest
in protecting children and the need for effective child labor laws." This sounds like
an evaluation of the strength of state interests and the justifiability of the law, which
is good evidence that the Court believed Mrs. Prince had satisfied the threshold test
and that the Court had moved on to apply some level of scrutiny to the law. The
Court ultimately upheld the conviction by finding the burden imposed by the child
labor laws to be justifiable.45
Yet in this particular case, the Court might have reached the same result at an
earlier stage by finding that Mrs. Prince had not satisfied the threshold test of showing
that the child labor laws burdened the exercise of her own sincere religious beliefs.
The state laws, of course, did not limit her own proselytizing activities; the law merely
required that she not use children to aid her. No evidence indicated that her religious
beliefs required her to use children to get the message out; indeed, the record showed
that although she had permitted the children to engage in this activity previously, prior
to the night in question she "generally did not take them with her at night," and in fact
on the night in question she initially refused to take them, only changing her mind
after they cried and begged to go.' If taking the children was optional according to
her own sincere religious beliefs, and taking the children was the only activity the
state "burdened," then the Court could have found that she failed to present a prima
facie case of a burden on the exercise of her religious beliefs. On the other hand, it
39 id.
40 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
i4 ld. at 161-62, 161 n.4, 163 n.6.
42 Id. at 160.
41 Id. at 170-71.
44 Id. at 165-71.
41 Id. at 169-70.
4 Id. at 161-62.
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is also possible that, if the factual record had been further developed on this point, it
would have showed that her religious beliefs required her to train her children in this
activity by at least occasionally involving them in her solicitation efforts-and of
course the child labor laws prohibited this. If this was Mrs. Prince's religious be-
lief, however, it does not appear plainly from the record; instead, both the Court and
Mrs. Prince herself seemed to stress that the religious beliefs at stake when Betty was
forbidden to solicit were those of Betty.47 However, Betty was not accused of violat-
ing the law.48 In other words, although the Court did not make this point, the facts
might leave ample room to find that Mrs. Prince had not stated a prima facie case of
a free exercise violation, because she might well have been able to comply with both
her own religious convictions and the state's child labor laws without being put to any
significant inconvenience. In essence, the threshold test requires that when such a
path is open, the believer must take it.
The Court may have dodged the threshold issue in Prince, but just three months
later, it decided United States v. Ballard, a case which required the Court to enunci-
ate the sincerity prong of the threshold test.49 Two members of the "I Am" movement
were charged with violating federal mail fraud statutes by making fraudulent religious
solicitations by mail; in their mailings they allegedly claimed, among other things,
that they had been selected as divine messengers of the teachings of "Saint Germain"
and that they had the power to heal any disease or injury.50 The prosecution further
alleged that these factual claims were made with the full knowledge that they were
false.5 The defendants claimed that, given the nature of their statements, prosecuting
them for knowingly making false statements was equivalent to passing judgment on
the validity of their religious beliefs and was therefore foreclosed by the Free Exercise
Clause.52 Although prosecutions for making false statements typically require the
prosecution to prove that the defendant's statements of fact were false, the Court held
that the jury must be instructed in this case to disregard whether the factual claims
themselves were true or false, considering only whether the defendants sincerely
believed the religious claims they made.53 In this case, two of the three elements of
the threshold test were not in question: the statements and solicitations were con-
' Id. at 162 (noting that when accused of violating the law, Mrs. Prince responded, "This
child is exercising her God-given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel"
(emphasis added)); id. at 162-63 (noting that testimony was offered "to show that Betty
believed it was her religious duty to perform this work and failure would bring condemnation
'to everlasting destruction at Armageddon').
48 Id. at 160.
49 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946).
5o Id. at 79-80.
I' d. at 80.
52 Id. at 85.
53 Id. at 81-82, 85-88.
[Vol. 17:103
2008] THE CONTINUING THRESHOLD TEST FOR FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 113
cededly religious in nature, and the burden imposed by the mail fraud statutes was
clear.54 The issue for thejury was whether the defendants could satisfy the sincerity
prong of the threshold test." Moreover, the Court upheld the district court's jury in-
structions specifying that if the jury found that the defendants sincerely believed the
factual representations they had made, the defendants ought to be acquitted on free
exercise grounds whether or not their representations were really true.56
Some years later, a plurality of the Court discussed the burden prong of the
threshold test in Braunfeld v. Brown.57 A state law prohibited the sale of certain retail
commodities on Sundays. 8 The claimants were Orthodox Jews who operated retail
stores in the state and testified that their religious beliefs compelled them to close their
stores on Saturdays.59 They filed suit claiming that the Sunday closing law violated
their free exercise rights by making it more expensive for them to practice their religion;
they noted that the law had made it impossible for them to follow their earlier practice
of staying open on Sunday to recoup some of the revenues they lost on Saturdays, and
that their competitors who were not Jews were able to remain open six days a week
even after the law went into effect.6' The Court rejected the claimants' free exercise
argument,6 but Chief Justice Warren's rationale for the plurality was somewhat un-
clear, meandering from an emphasis on the merely "economic" and "indirect" burden
imposed on the claimants, 62 to an emphasis on the state's interest in providing a uni-
form day of rest,63 to a discussion of the practical difficulties posed if the state were
forced to grant an exemption to the claimants and others similarly situated.'
*4 Id. at 79.
5 Id. at 81.
56 Id. (quoting the district court instructing the jury that "[t]he issue is: Did these defendants
honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they should be acquitted"); id.
at 86-87 (upholding the district court instructions by noting that "[w]hatever this particular
indictment might require, the First Amendment precludes" submission to the jury of the question
of the truth of defendants' religious statements, and while "[t]he miracles of the New Testament,
the Divinity of Christ, life after death, [and] the power of prayer are deep in the religious con-
victions of many," it is also true that "[ijf one could be sent to jail because a jury ... found
those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom").
57 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
" Id. at 600 (plurality opinion).
'9 Id. at 601.
60 Id. at 601-02.
61 Id. at 609.
62 Id. at 605-07.
63 Id. at 607.
6 Id. at 608-09. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion in Braunfeld, with its meandering
and imprecise rationale invoking both state interests and minimal burdens, is quite reminis-
cent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Davey. See infra notes 227-42
and accompanying text; see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-25 (2004).
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In the end, the Court conceded that even "indirect" burdens were sometimes (in
an ill-defined set of circumstances) unconstitutional ones, but the Court clearly con-
cluded that the indirect burden here was not of that kind.65 Hence, the Court had per-
mission to take account of the indirect nature of the burden as a factor weighing against
the claim. The outcome seems to have been influenced to some extent by the fact that
the burden on the claimants was merely indirect.' Indeed, that fact could have been
decisive in this case as a practical matter. The Chief Justice certainly could have been
clearer on this point, but the denial of the claim could be understood as having been
grounded primarily in the claimants' failure to satisfy the burden prong of the thresh-
old test for free exercise claims. The Court apparently did not doubt that the claimants
sincerely believed that their religion required them to close shop on Saturdays 67-
but that is not the act the statute prohibited. The statute prohibited opening shop on
Sundays, and the claimants could not show that their religious beliefs required them
to do this.' Thus, the Court may have concluded that they had not shown that the state
had burdened the exercise of their sincere religious beliefs. The claimants argued
that the law burdened them by taking money out of their pockets, but the plurality
replied that if that sufficed to demonstrate a "burden" on religious exercise, then an
income tax law that does not allow a charitable deduction would similarly "burden"
someone whose religion requires charitable giving.69 In both situations the problem
is the same: the activity required (or forbidden) by the law is not the activity forbidden
(or required) by the religion.70 The charitable donor's religion does not forbid pay-
ment of income taxes as required by law, and the Jewish faith does not forbid closing
on Sundays as required by law. Or to put it another way, the reason the claimants in
Braunfeld wanted to do what was legally forbidden-to open shop on Sundays-
was not a religious reason.
The Court squarely addressed all three elements of the threshold test as early as
1963 in the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner." Ms. Sherbert was a member of
the Seventh-day Adventist Church who worked at a textile mill in South Carolina.72
Two years after her employment began, her employer ordered her to begin working
on Saturdays, "the Sabbath Day of her faith."73 When she refused for religious
65 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
66 See id. at 609 (concluding that "For all of these reasons, we cannot say that the
Pennsylvania statute before us is invalid, either on its face or as applied" (emphasis added)).
67 See id. at 603, 605-06.
' See id. at 605-06.
69 Id. at 606.
70 Later, the Court would make this argument much more explicitly as it evaluated asser-
tions of burden in a pair of cases involving tax laws. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying
text.
71 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
72 Id. at 399 & n. 1.
73 Id.
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reasons, she was discharged and was subsequently unable to find comparable employ-
ment that did not require Saturday work.74 The state denied her application for un-
employment compensation, citing a statutory provision denying benefits to persons
who "failed, without good cause... to accept available suitable work when offered
him by ... the employer."75 She claimed that by denying her benefits on this ground,
the state had violated the Free Exercise Clause.76 In approaching her claim, the Court
first noted that her religiously motivated conduct, consisting of the refusal to work
at a textile mill on Saturdays, was not the sort of "substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order" that was itself "within the reach of state legislation."77 Since this was
true, the Court reasoned that South Carolina could only win if Ms. Sherbert failed to
state a prima facie case of a burden on her free exercise rights, or if South Carolina's
denial served some compelling state interest:
If, therefore, the decision [to deny her benefits] is to withstand
appellant' s constitutional challenge, it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the
State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any
incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may
be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate....""
The Court first decided whether she had demonstrated a burden on her free
exercise rights. This is the threshold test. It required a showing that Ms. Sherbert's
conduct was motivated by religious beliefs, that those beliefs were sincerely held, and
that the state had imposed a burden on the conduct.79 The Court found that she had
made the required showing under each of the three prongs. Earlier in the opinion, the
Court had already addressed the sincerity and religion prongs separately as it noted,
"No question has been raised in this case concerning the sincerity of appellant's reli-
gious beliefs. Nor is there any doubt that the prohibition against Saturday labor is a
basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed, based upon that religion's interpre-
tation of the Holy Bible."8 The Court then turned to the burden prong: "Here not
only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely
from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice
is unmistakable."'" The Court found this "pressure" to amount to a burden that
14 Id. at 399 & n.2.
" Id. at 400 n.3 (quoting S.C. CODE, § 68-114(3) (1962)).
76 Id. at 401-02.
7 Id. at 403.
's Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
79 Id. at 404-06.
80 Id. at 399 n. 1.81 Id. at 404.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
rounded out a prima facie case under the Free Exercise Clause: "[T]o condition the
availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal prin-
ciple of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties. ' 2 Thus the Court determined that Ms. Sherbert had satisfied each element
of the threshold test. This determination, however, did not mean automatic victory
for Ms. Sherbert; it meant that the Court had to scrutinize the state's decision in light
of the asserted state interests and the extent of the burden. In the final step of its anal-
ysis, the Court found that the state's decision to withhold benefits from Ms. Sherbert
could not withstand such scrutiny. 3
In subsequent years, the Court decided several more free exercise cases involving
denial of unemployment compensation. In each case, the Court applied the threshold
test and, finding it satisfied, applied strict scrutiny. In the first of these cases, Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, the Court explained the
judge's role in applying the religion and sincerity prongs of the threshold test:
Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause .... The determination of what is a "religious" belief or
practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task, [but] the
resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception
of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others
in order to merit First Amendment protection. [Although there was
evidence that other members of his faith did not feel compelled to
act as Thomas did,] it is not within the judicial function and judicial
competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to
determine whether there was an appropriate finding that peti-
tioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that
such work was forbidden by his religion."
82 Id. at 406.
I id. at 406-09. The level of scrutiny applied seems to have been strict scrutiny. See id.
at 406 (questioning "whether some compelling state interest.. .justifies the substantial infringe-
ment of appellant's First Amendment right"); id. ("[N]o showing merely of a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest would suffice."); id. at 407 (noting that although the state
asserted a compelling interest in preventing spurious unemployment claims, "even if the
possibility of spurious claims did threaten [harm], it would plainly be incumbent upon the
[state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights").
8 450 U.S. 707, 713-14, 716 (1981).
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Next, the Court addressed the burden prong and found it satisfied on the
authority of Sherbert; in light of the claimant's religious reasons for refusing to
work, a selective denial of a generally available benefit in this case amounted to a
cognizable burden. 5 Upon determining that Thomas satisfied the threshold test, the
Court applied strict scrutiny. 6
The other unemployment cases proceeded similarly. In Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida, the Court was careful from the inception to note that
"[it is undisputed that appellant's conversion [to the Seventh-day Adventist faith] was
bona fide and that her religious belief is sincerely held."87 The Court spent scarcely
more time addressing the burden prong, finding it easily satisfied on the authority
of Sherbert and Thomas.88 Once the threshold test was satisfied, the Court applied
strict scrutiny. 9 Similarly in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,
the Court applied the threshold test before (somewhat summarily) applying strict scru-
tiny.' In light of evidence that Frazee was not a member of any organized religious
group, the Court elaborated on the sincerity and religion prongs of the threshold test:
Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination,
especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work
on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely
held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding
to the commands of a particular religious organization.9'
Together, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee show that the threshold test requires the courts
to determine whether the claimant has shown a state burden on the exercise of his sin-
cere religious beliefs; and this determination is to be made without regard to whether
the beliefs seem logical to the court, whether other members of his faith agree with
him, or whether he correctly interpreted the religious authorities he claims to follow.
Evidence of the claimant's membership in a religious organization, and of the orga-
nization' s creed, is relevant but not determinative in deciding whether the claimant
sincerely held a particular religious belief.
85 Id. at 717-18.
86 See id. at 718 ('The mere fact that the petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a
governmental program does not mean that an exemption accommodating his practice must
be granted. The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
' 480 U.S. 136, 138 n.2 (1987).
88 Id. at 140-41, 143.
89 Id. at 141-42.
90 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) ("ITihere may exist state interests sufficiently compelling to
override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has been presented
here.").
9' Id. at 834.
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Of course, in cases where the claimant was a member of an established and well
known religious group, establishing evidence of sincere religious conviction has
proven somewhat easier. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court noted that the claimants
were members of Amish communities, and that these communities did not, like Henry
David Thoreau, endorse isolation as a merely philosophical matter, but were widely
known sincerely to believe that segregation from the world was an intrinsic require-
ment of their faith.92 Quickly adding that a compulsory school attendance law obvi-
ously imposed a burden on the exercise of these beliefs,93 the Court went on to apply
strict scrutiny, evaluating and ultimately rejecting the state's claim that its interest
in compulsory education for all its residents was so compelling as to disallow any
exemption for the Amish.94
A decade later, in another case involving the Amish, the claimants again satisfied
the threshold test, but this time the Court rejected their claim because the govern-
ment burden was deemed justifiable. In United States v. Lee, the Amish claimant
brought a free exercise action in which he challenged federal statutes that required
payment of social security payroll taxes, alleging that his religion obligated him to
provide for the needs of the elderly and disabled within the Amish community and
that payment of the taxes was forbidden by his faith.95 The government conceded the
sincerity of his religious belief that he was obligated to provide assistance to others,
but contested his assertion that payment of these taxes was forbidden by the Amish
faith. 6 The Court began by applying the threshold test, noting that "[t]he prelimi-
nary inquiry in determining the existence of a constitutionally required exemption is
whether the payment of social security taxes and the receipt of benefits interferes with
the free exercise rights of the Amish."97 The Court then quickly rejected the govern-
ment's invitation to determine what the Amish religion teaches: "It is not within 'the
judicial function and judicial competence' ... to determine whether appellee or the
Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; '[ciourts are not arbiters
of scriptural interpretation."' 98 The Court was convinced from the record evidence
that the claimant sincerely believed that the payment of these taxes was forbidden by
his religion, and this was enough to satisfy the threshold test, whether or not his belief
was a "correct" understanding of Amish doctrine.' Additionally, the Court noted that
another group had sought a religious exemption to these laws, concluding in light of
that evidence that "[t]his is not an instance in which the asserted claim is 'so bizarre,
92 406 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1972).
9' Id. at 218-19.
94 Id. at 219-30, 234.
91 455 U.S. 252, 254-55, 257 (1982).
96 Id. at 257.
97 Id. at 256-57.
98 Id. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 716 (1981)).
99 See id.
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so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.""'1° Although the Court ultimately rejected the claimant's chal-
lenge on the ground that the tax laws as applied to him were justifiable and satisfied
strict scrutiny,' Lee stands for the proposition that courts must apply the threshold
test in a judicious and sensitive way, not deciding whether a belief is true or accurate
but whether it is sincerely held by the claimant as a religious matter. In deciding this,
courts must give a certain amount of credence to the claimant's assertions, but need
not take them at face value if they are so "bizarre" that one is led to doubt whether
they are in fact the sincere religious beliefs of the claimant.
2. Later Development: Failures to Satisfy the Threshold Test
The clearest statements of the meaning of the various elements of the threshold
test, however, are found in cases where the Court finds one or more of these
elements unsatisfied. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Court decided a series of free
exercise cases in which the Court upheld the state action at issue because a prima
facie case had not been shown.
The first of these turned out to be a forceful statement of the importance of satis-
fying the threshold test. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,
the Court considered a claim by a religious organization that owned over thirty dif-
ferent commercial businesses operated largely through the "voluntary" services of
many adherents, to whom the organization offered food, housing, and other valuable
things, sometimes supporting them for many years. 02 The organization argued that
forcing it to comply with federal minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping statutes
regarding the services of these adherents would be depriving it and its adherents of the
free exercise of religion. 10 3 The Court turned first to the threshold test: "It is virtually
self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a gov-
ernmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens
the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights.""° The Court seemed to grant for
purposes of argument that the organization and its adherents sincerely held religious
views that the payment of wages was anathema and that compensation of workers
should be in the form of food, clothing, and shelter.105 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the organization had failed to show a significant burden on the exercise of those
religious beliefs, because: (1) the organization was allowed by the statutes to con-
tinue giving food, clothing, and shelter to workers as their religious beliefs might
100 Id. at 257 n.6 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715).
101 Id. at 257-60.
102 471 U.S. 290, 292 & n.2, 299-301 (1985).
103 Id. at 303.
104 id.
'o Id. at 303-05.
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dictate, as long as the organization kept and filed the required records and the value of
these benefits equaled or exceeded the minimum value required by statute; and (2) after
receiving these benefits (or cash), workers were allowed by the statutes, if their religious
beliefs so dictated, to give any or all of them back to the organization. 106 The Court
thus did not see why these claimants could not satisfy the demands of both the federal
statutes and their religious beliefs simultaneously, and in the absence of any real burden
on the exercise of sincere religious beliefs, the Court upheld the application of the
statutes to this religious organization.'l 7
Just one year later, in Bowen v. Roy, the Court once again found a failure to satisfy
the threshold test for free exercise claims." The appellees were practitioners of
Native American religious beliefs and parents of a two-year-old daughter."° The
father asserted that according to his religious views, "the uniqueness of the Social
Security number as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of the number over
which she has no control, will serve to 'rob the spirit' of his daughter and prevent her
from attaining greater spiritual power."" Although the federal government had
already assigned the daughter a Social Security number by the time the trial court
proceedings concluded, there was no evidence that the number had been used for
anything, and the father stated that he believed her spirit had not yet been damaged
and would not be harmed unless the number was used; he therefore requested an
injunction forbidding the use or dissemination of the number by federal or state
governments, citing his free exercise rights."'
Importantly, the Court did not, in this case, rule on the question of whether the
parents could be required to do anything with the number as a condition of receiving
benefits."2 A majority of the Court did hold, however, that the government's creation
and future use of the number would not in itself be deemed a burden on the parents'
free exercise rights." 3 The Court did not question the religious nature of the father's
106 Id. at 303--04.
'07 Id. at 304-06.
101 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
'01 Id. at 695-96.
"o Id. at 696.
" Id. at 697-98.
1 See id. at 695 (stating the question presented as involving statutory requirements that
a number be provided by applicants and that state governments make use of the number); id.
at 700-01 (stating a holding that Roy's objection to the statutory requirement that state govern-
ments make use of the number is without merit). A plurality of three Justices, in a portion of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion not for the Court, also rejected the parents' free exercise claim
that they could notconstitutionally be compelled to do anything with the Social Security num-
ber as a condition of receiving benefits. See id. at 711-12 (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell &
Rehnquist, JJ., concurring) (rejecting appellee's free exercise demand for exemption from
the statutory requirement that an identification number be provided by applicants to govern-
ment programs).
113 id. at 700--01.
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beliefs, nor did it suggest he was insincere.114 Rather, the Court found that the
parents could not satisfy the burden prong of the threshold test, because whatever
"burden" was imposed on the parents by the government's creation and use of the
number, it did not make more costly or burdensome any religiously motivated
conduct of the parents; instead, it imposed its "burden" of spiritual harm regardless
of the parents' actions.' The government activity therefore did not provide any
incentive for them to act inconsistently with their faith, nor did it force a choice
between practicing their religion and obeying the state. In essence, the claim here
was merely that the government was acting in a way that conflicted with the par-
ents' religious views of what the government should be doing. The Court held that
such facts did not present a prima facie case under the Free Exercise Clause." 6
Likely the Court feared a slippery slope: allowing such claims to proceed would be
inviting a host of plaintiffs to use free exercise claims to complain on moral or
religious grounds about how government is being run, whether or not its operations
impose any tangible, non-spiritual burdens on their religious conduct.
The Court's conclusion in Roy suggests something important about how the
burden test will be applied. Even if a claimant sincerely believes as a religious matter
that some government activity harms his spirit or in some other way interferes with
his ability to worship effectively, the government will not be deemed to have bur-
dened his free exercise of religion unless the burden is somehow correlated to the
claimant's religiously motivated activities. The government imposed burden must
provide incentives for the claimant to do something religiously forbidden or forego
something religiously recommended. Such was not the case in Roy, as the govern-
ment's use of Social Security numbers did not provide any incentive for the parents
or the daughter to do anything or refrain from anything.
Another free exercise decision issued two years later, also involving Native
American religious beliefs, clarified that this was indeed the Court's understanding
of Roy. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n involved a challenge to
a federal government plan to permit timber harvesting in, and build a road through,
some of its own National Forest lands, including an area that the claimants regarded
114 See generally id. at 695-701 (characterizing father's asserted beliefs using terms such
as "Roy believes," "Roy's religious concerns," and "Roy testified to his belief that," and
assuming sincerity of his uncontradicted testimony regarding his religious beliefs).
1' See id. at 699-701 (upholding governmental action by noting absence of governmental
coercion and opining that "Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the
Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere
religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets. The Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it
does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal pro-
cedures .... The Federal Government's use of a Social Security number for [his daughter] does
not itself in any degree impair Roy's 'freedom to believe, express, and exercise' his religion").
116 See id. at 700-01 (rejecting the free exercise challenge due to lack of burden on claim-
ant's conduct).
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as sacred and had used for years in religious rituals. 7 The Court conceded that the
claimants' religious beliefs were sincere and that the road construction would have
"severe adverse effects" on their ability to practice their religion."' Nevertheless, the
Court refused to scrutinize the government's plan, finding that the claimants had not
satisfied the threshold test for free exercise claims." 9 This conclusion was rooted in
Roy, which the Court viewed as standing for the proposition that "incidental effects
of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain reli-
gions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs," do not present a prima facie case under the Free Exercise Clause
and do not trigger strict scrutiny.'
Had the Court wished to do so, it could have distinguished Roy from Lyng in a
number of ways. Most importantly, the activities of building or destroying something
on a parcel of land, as the government well knew before its actions in Lyng,'2' are
more likely to have adverse effects on others than the activity of assigning numbers
to individual records as part of an internal and confidential recordkeeping system. 2
However, the two cases did have this in common: the adverse effects alleged in
both cases were of a spiritual nature, effects that would only be deemed "adverse"
by those sharing the claimants' religious beliefs. The Court seemed to conclude that
by deeming one set of effects more substantial or cognizable than the other, it would
be passing judgment on the relative validity of the beliefs themselves, a move it was
unwilling to make. 123 Instead of embarking on some evaluation of the relative severity
of the spiritual harms imposed or the "centrality" of a particular practice within each
claimant's religious belief system, the Court chose to draw a line between policies
"1 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988).
.1. Id. at 447.
"9 See id. ("[Claimants] contend that the burden on their religious practices is heavy enough
to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate a compelling need
to complete the G-O road or to engage in timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. We
disagree."); id. at 465, 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not for a moment
suggest that the [government's] interests... are in any way compelling, or that they outweigh
the destructive effect ... on respondents' religious practices.... Today, the Court holds that
a federal land-use decision that promises to destroy an entire religion does not burden the
practice of that faith in a manner recognized by the Free Exercise Clause.").
120 Id. at 450.
121 See id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that, in light of the prior passage of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the duties and concerns there noted with respect
to Native Americans' religious use of federal lands, free exercise claims of Native Americans
challenging government's timber harvesting and road construction plan "should hardly come
as a surprise"); id. at 472 (noting language in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
which warns that federal policies often interfere with Native American religious practices that
are linked to particular tracts of land).
'2 See id. at 469-72.
'23 See id. at 449-50, 457-58.
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presenting incidental impediments to religious practice, which do not state a claim,
and policies tending to induce or "coerce individuals [to act] contrary to their religious
beliefs," which do state a claim. 24 Making explicit its fears of a slippery slope, the
Court buttressed its conclusion by noting that:
[Gjovernment simply could not operate if it were required to
satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires. A broad range
of government activities ... will always be considered essential
to the spiritual well-being of some citizens ... [while others]
will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps in-
compatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with
the tenets of their religion.... The Constitution does not, and
courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands
on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief,
that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. 25
Hence, the Court solidly defined the burden prong of the threshold test to require
not just a showing that "the challenged Government action would interfere signifi-
cantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their
own religious beliefs," but a showing that "the affected individuals [would] be co-
erced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs," or that the
"governmental action [would] penalize religious activity by denying any person an
equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.' 26
124 Id. at 450-51.
125 Id. at 452.
126 Id. at 449. Regardless of whether this rule is justifiable in cases such as Lyng and Roy,
in which the government is using only its own property and perhaps cannot be expected to
defend its every "internal" decision against a multiplicity of religious challenges, the rule might
be quite difficult to defend in other applications in which the government uses or devalues the
property of others. To see the problem, one need only imagine that the tribe and not the govern-
ment had owned the land at issue in Lyng, and that the government had used its eminent domain
power to seize, for road construction, the tribe's sacred land. Whatever payment the tribe would
be entitled to under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause would be cold comfort to the tribe,
which would be effectively prohibited from worship as soon as construction began. This
taking is no "internal" decision by the government about the use of its own resources, as in
Roy and Lyng. Under the Court's rule in Lyng, however, the tribe still could not likely present
a prima facie case under the Free Exercise Clause, because once again the government's action
would not tend to induce or coerce the tribe to act contrary to its religious beliefs. But if the
government had instead fined the tribe for using the sacred tribe-owned lands rather than seizing
the lands, the tribe could clearly state a prima facie case (as the fine would provide an induce-
ment to refrain from worship). It is not clear why the tribe's religious rights should be suddenly
unprotected when a governmental action makes their worship impossible rather than merely
expensive.
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Shortly after its decision in Lyng, the Court applied the threshold test to reject two
separate challenges to the treatment of religious activities under tax laws. In the first
of these, Hernandez v. Commissioner, members of the Church of Scientology chal-
lenged the federal income tax laws on the ground that the laws did not allow the mem-
bers to deduct from taxable income "fixed donations" of money which they had paid
to their church in exchange for religious benefits conferred in one-on-one counseling
and training sessions."' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Tax Court
denied these deductions on the theory that the claimants had received consideration,
in the form of religious benefits, for their "fixed donations" and therefore the money
represented payment for services rather than a gift.'28 The claimants asserted that both
the sessions and the payments were required by their religious beliefs, and that, there-
fore, the Commissioner's decision burdened the practice of their religion by deter-
ring them from engaging in the sessions and by interfering with their payments for
the sessions.'29
After noting that all free exercise claimants must satisfy the threshold test of stating
"a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice,"' 30
the Court focused on the weakness in the claimants' prima facie case. While acknowl-
edging the sincerity and religious nature of their beliefs, and while declining to deter-
mine whether a given religious practice was "central" or to question their interpreta-
tions of the requirements of their faith, the Court expressed doubt that they had shown
a "substantial burden" on their religiously motivated practices, since they had never
alleged that payment of taxes was forbidden by their religious beliefs. 131 The Court
reasoned that these claimants were perfectly free to engage in the sessions and to pay
for them, even if the government refused to subsidize their activities through a tax
deduction; thus the only "burden" imposed was the same as that imposed by income
taxes generally: the claimants would have less after-tax money to spend.'32 In the
Court's view, this likely did not rise to the level of stating a prima facie case of a dep-
rivation of free exercise rights. Ultimately, however, the Court upheld the tax laws
on the separate ground that they could satisfy the Court's scrutiny even if they signifi-
cantly burdened religious practice. 13
3
The second tax case was Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization
of California, in which a religious organization claimed that it was entitled under
the Free Exercise Clause to an exemption from state sales and use taxes related to
its sales of religious materials such as Bibles and sermons.33 The Court repeated
127 490 U.S. 680, 684-86 (1989).
121 Id. at 686-87.
129 Id. at 698.
130 Id. at 699.
131 Id.
132 Id.
113 Id. at 699-700.
134 493 U.S. 378, 382-83 (1990).
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the Hernandez formulation of the threshold test, requiring claimants to show that
"'government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious
belief or practice ... ."135 Once again, the Court questioned whether the claimant
had made this showing. In the Court's view Hernandez was controlling on this
point; after quoting from Hernandez, the Court noted that the claimants here, as in
Hernandez, had failed to produce any evidence that payment of taxes was forbidden
by their religious beliefs.136 Thus the state's tax laws had not pressured the claimants
to violate their consciences or modify their beliefs. '37 Seeing no significant distinction
between the availability of a deduction and the imposition of a tax, the Court found
that the claimants' argument once again boiled down to an assertion that religious
exercise is burdened when religious people have less money to spend.'38 But this
same "burden" is caused by a host of generally applicable and costly regulations, such
as health and safety regulations, to which religious organizations and persons must
adhere; therefore, "to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely
decreases the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any
such burden is not constitutionally significant."' 139 The Court thus rejected the orga-
nization's claim for failure to satisfy the threshold test. 4
The Supreme Court's modem free exercise cases leading up to Smith demon-
strate with remarkable consistency that the Court continuously required free
exercise claimants to satisfy the threshold test. It is true that the threshold test for
free exercise claims was more fully articulated, and perhaps strengthened at the
margins, in the more recent cases. Still, throughout the period studied here, no
claimant prevailed who could not demonstrate a real burden on his or her exercise
of sincerely held religious beliefs. To the extent claimants were able to comply
with the commands of both law and faith without being burdened or inconve-
nienced, the Court continuously required them to do so, disallowing free exercise
claims grounded in mere offense or avoidable burdens.
II. THE THRESHOLD TEST IN SMITH AND LUKUMI
Although much of Free Exercise law changed in the wake of Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the threshold test
was never questioned or modified, in Smith or in the subsequent cases that applied
135 Id. at 384 (quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699).
136 Id. at 391.
137 Id. at 391-92.
138 Id. at 391.
9 Id. (citing Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699).
14 See id. at 392 ("We therefore conclude that the collection and payment of the generally
applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant's religious
practices or beliefs.").
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Smith.'4' The Smith Court announced a more lenient level of scrutiny for most free
exercise claims that met the threshold test; it did not announce or even imply a more
lenient threshold test.1
42
A. The Threshold Test in Smith
Smith involved practitioners of a Native American religion who were fired from
theirjobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization when it was discovered that they
had ingested peyote, a western cactus containing a hallucinogenic drug, as part of a
religious ritual. 43 They then applied to the State of Oregon for unemployment com-
pensation but were denied benefits due to a statutory provision forbidding compensa-
tion for those who were fired due to "work-related 'misconduct."" 44 The claimants
argued that denying their application on these grounds violated the Free Exercise
Clause. 45 In an earlier proceeding before the Supreme Court in this case, the Court
had expressed uncertainty whether Oregon considered the claimants' acts to be a
crime, but had opined that if the state had made peyote use a crime, and if the applica-
tion of that criminal law to these claimants could be upheld under the First Amend-
ment, then the denial of benefits would likewise be upheld.'46 Hence, the Court
remanded the case to the Oregon state courts for a determination whether the claim-
ants' peyote use would constitute a crime under Oregon law.'47 The Supreme Court
of Oregon ruled that it would, and the Supreme Court of the United States again
granted certiorari to decide the free exercise claim, framed now as a question of
whether Oregon's law criminalizing peyote use could be applied to the claimants
consistently with the Free Exercise Clause. 148 The answer, according to the Supreme
Court of the United States, was yes.
149
The Court reached this conclusion by rejecting a strict scrutiny standard of review
in favor of deference to the state, and the entirety of the Court's opinion is devoted
to defending that deference as the proper standard of review for most free exercise
claims involving neutral laws of general applicability." 0 As long as the law is neutral
and generally applicable, said the Court, the burden it imposes on the exercise of the
claimant's religious beliefs, however onerous, is not constitutionally significant:
141 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
142 Indeed, to the extent the Smith holding was grounded in the Court's desire to reduce the
total number of free exercise claims, the Court would not likely have relaxed the threshold
test on purpose, a move which would have the opposite effect.
141 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
I" Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 875.
147 Id. at 875-76.
'48 Id. at 876.
149 Id. at 890.
0o Id. at 874-90.
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"[If prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the [protected activity]) is not
the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."'151
This emphasis on the neutrality of the law as the controlling factor, rather than
on the extent of the burden or the religiosity or sincerity of the claimants, makes it
clear that the Court's presumption in favor of government was neither a rejection
nor a modification of the threshold test itself. The Court never questioned that the
claimants in Smith sincerely believed as a religious matter that they should ingest pey-
ote as part of a sacred ritual, nor did the Court suggest that they could behave as their
religion required without significant burden. In other words, the Court never sug-
gested that the claimants had failed to satisfy the threshold test, or that the test did not
matter. Surely the Court could have rejected the claim without any new standard of
deference to the government had the claimants been insincere, had their religious be-
liefs not counseled use of peyote, or had the law not burdened them so heavily. More-
over, this was not, like Lyng, an instance in which the claimants had failed to show
that the state's law, while effectively precluding their worship, had "no tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs;' 52 on the contrary,
the criminal law here clearly tended to coerce the claimants into abandoning their
ritual in order to avoid criminal penalties. But these concerns were irrelevant to the
Court's decision. Instead, the Court emphasized repeatedly that the burden, exten-
sive or even prohibitive as it might be, was not forbidden by the First Amendment:
"[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."I"53
This emphasis is important. Of course, in this case the claimants would have lost
just the same whether the Court found that the claimants had failed to make out a
prima facie case of a burden on free exercise rights, on the one hand, or found that the
burden was clear but justifiable, on the other. But the Court took the latter approach,
and that might make a world of difference in future cases. Because the Smith Court
did not reject the threshold test, every free exercise case still requires courts to con-
sider whether the claimant has satisfied the test, particularly if the law at issue might
not be neutral or generally applicable.'54
It seems that the Smith Court did not modify or question the threshold test in
any way. This treatment accorded with its free exercise precedents, in which the
threshold test had been applied separately from and prior to requiring any level of gov-
ernmental justification for a law or practice. Moreover, this treatment makes sense
I"' Id. at 878.
152 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-52 (1988);
supra notes 120, 124, 126 and accompanying text.
"I' Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
"4 See infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text (Lukumi); infra Part II (Davey).
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analytically. There is a conceptual difference between requiring the claimant to state
a prima facie case of burden, which she must do just to "get in the door" in these cases,
and requiring (or not requiring) the government to assert an especially persuasive rea-
son in support of the burden it imposed. The Smith opinion is all about whether the
state should have to provide any special justification for the class of "generally appli-
cable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious
practice."'55 The Court is thus speaking only about the class of laws that concededly
impose a burden on sincere religious practice. This emphasis again strongly suggests
that the Court was assuming the prima facie case was sufficiently made out, so that
the Court was focused on the next phase of the analysis, the standard of review. For
neutral laws of general applicability, Smith teaches that review will be highly defer-
ential to the government in most cases. In free exercise claims involving such laws,
even where the claimant can satisfy the threshold test, strict scrutiny will now be
reserved for hybrid claims invoking more than one constitutional right.'56
The Court went out of its way to declare that neutral, generally applicable laws
will not be strictly scrutinized in other cases, even those cases in which a claimant
asserts that the burdened religious views or practices are "central" to his religion.'57
A judicial inquiry into "centrality," the Court opined, would be impermissible for
any purpose:
[Ilt is no more appropriate forjudges to determine the "centrality"
of religious beliefs before applying a "compelling interest" test
in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine
the "importance" of ideas before applying the "compelling interest"
test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be
brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular
act is "central" to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of dif-
ferent religious practices is akin to the unacceptable "business
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims."' 58
This rejection of the "centrality" inquiry was unsurprising. Although individual
Justices had occasionally endorsed such an inquiry, 59 a majority of the Court had
never accepted the invitation to distinguish between "central" and more peripheral
religious beliefs.)" Quoting from its opinion issued the previous year in Hernandez,
the Court in Smith confirmed its rejection of the centrality inquiry:
"I Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (emphasis added).
16 See supra note 2.
"I Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.
358 Id. (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
9 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,474-76 (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
'60 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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[It] is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of partic-
ular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." Repeatedly and
in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
or the plausibility of a religious claim.161
Rejection of the centrality inquiry, however, did not imply rejection of the threshold
test, which had been applied or assumed by Court majorities for decades.'62 Indeed
in Hernandez itself, although the Court clearly rejected any inquiry into the centrality
of religious beliefs or practices or the validity of the claimants' interpretation of par-
ticular religious creeds, the Court expressed doubt that the claimants presented a
prima facie case of burden on the exercise of their sincere religious beliefs, because
the Court did not see how the claimants' asserted religious beliefs would keep them
from paying their taxes as required by law.'6 3 Over the years the Court never jetti-
soned the threshold test, despite explicit judicial recognition that its inquiries into
the sincerity of a professing claimant and the requirements of his professed faith must
not be taken too far. Throughout its free exercise jurisprudence, the Court never
required claimants to demonstrate that their religious beliefs were true or plausible,
or that their religious beliefs or practices were important or "central" to their religion,
nor did the Court second-guess a claimant's interpretation of his own religious creed;
in fact the Court often warned against these practices.' 6 The Court, however, con-
sistently required claimants as a threshold matter to show that their beliefs were reli-
gious, that their beliefs were sincerely held, and that the government had burdened the
claimants' practice of those beliefs.165 The Smith Court broke no new ground when
it rejected the centrality inquiry while still assuming that successful claimants must
show a burden on the exercise of their sincere religious beliefs.
B. The Threshold Test in Lukumi
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the threshold test in its next free exercise
case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, in which it applied the
test but found it satisfied."6
The claimants challenged city ordinances forbidding the sacrifice of any animal
within the city limits, and defining "sacrifice" as "to unnecessarily kill... an animal
161 Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
162 See supra Part I.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
'64 See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,257 (1982);
Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981).
165 See supra Part I.
166 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food con-
sumption."" The ordinances explicitly excluded from this prohibition some types of
animal killings, such as killings by "licensed establishments" of animals "specifically
raised for food purposes."' 68 The claimants, adherents to a religion called Santeria,
asserted that their religious beliefs required ritualistic animal sacrifice on certain
occasions, 69 and that the city ordinances violated the Free Exercise Clause. 70
Before ultimately siding with the claimants, the Court first determined that
they had satisfied the elements of the threshold test for free exercise claims. Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court.' The portion of his opinion which became the opinion
of the Court was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens and Thomas, and
Justice Scalia, 172 who had authored the Court's opinion in Smith.
The Court began its analysis by considering the claimant's case under the "religion"
prong of the threshold test: "The city does not argue that Santeria is not a 'religion'
within the meaning of the First Amendment."' 173 Therefore the claimants had satisfied
this prong. However, lest someone be tempted to apply the religion prong more strictly
and contest the labeling of these beliefs as "religious," the Court reiterated its refusal
to evaluate the orthodoxy or logic of religious beliefs: "Although the practice of
animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, 'religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection."" 74 It was important for the Justices to feel assured that the claimants'
beliefs were religious in nature, but not that those beliefs made sense to outsiders.
Next, the Court similarly noted its satisfaction with the claimants' showing under
the sincerity prong of the threshold test: "Neither the city nor the courts below...
have questioned the sincerity of petitioners' professed desire to conduct animal sacri-
fices for religious reasons."' 75 This might have settled the matter, but the Court also
evaluated the claimants' sincerity independently, using the "beyond the pale" standard
adopted from its opinion in Frazee: "Given the historical association between animal
sacrifice and religious worship... petitioners' assertion that animal sacrifice is an
integral part of their religion 'cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible." 76 Since the
167 id. at 527.
'61 Id. at 527-28.
169 Id. at 524-25.
17o Id. at 528.
I d. at 522.
172 Id.
17" Id. at 531.
17 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981)).
171 Id. at531.
176 Id. (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989)).
This standard was also employed in Lee and Thomas, and is discussed above in connection
with Lee. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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claimants' assertions as to their religious beliefs were not beyond the pale of believ-
ability, the Court indicated it would have found that the claimants had satisfied the
sincerity prong even if the government had contested their sincerity.
The Court never explicitly considered the claimants' showing under the burden
prong of the threshold test; rather, immediately after noting that no one contested
the religious nature of the beliefs or the claimants' sincerity, the Court concluded
tersely: "We must consider petitioners' First Amendment claim."' 7 7 The Court then
moved on to evaluate the ordinances under a selected level of scrutiny, without elab-
orating on the burden prong.77 The most likely explanation is that the Court thought
the showing of burden in this case too obvious to mention. The Court had discussed
at length the ordinances and their effects in its recitation of the facts and posture of
the case. 179 In many subsequent passages, too, the Court referred to the issue pre-
sented in the case as if the burden on the claimants had already been established. 8 '
Though its opinion does not make this point in so many words, the Court probably
thought it obvious that if certain laws imposed criminal penalties on those who engage
in a certain practice, the laws clearly burdened that practice and had a "tendency to
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs" to the extent those
beliefs required the practice.' Having noted that the practice at issue was forbidden
by criminal law, and was conceded by all to be required by the claimants' sincere
religious beliefs, the Court found the threshold test satisfied and moved on.
The claimants had made out a prima facie case of a deprivation of free exercise
rights, and so it remained for the Court to determine under some standard of review
whether the ordinances were justifiable despite the burdens they imposed. This anal-
ysis formed the heart of the opinion. First, the Court found that the ordinances in this
case were neither neutral 82 nor generally applicable.'83 Next, the Court reaffirmed
that the proper standard of review for such governmental action was strict scrutiny.'
Finally, in applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that these ordinances were not
narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling governmental interest, and struck them
down on that basis.8 5 Not only had the claimants satisfied the threshold test for free
exercise claims, but they had won the case, because the government had been unable
to convince the Court that its laws were justifiable burdens on religious liberty.
"I Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
178 id.
179 Id. at 526-30.
"8o See, e.g., id. at 546 ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny." (emphasis added)); id. at 542
("[L]aws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability." (emphasis added)).
181 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988); supra
notes 120, 124, 126 and accompanying text.
182 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532-40.
113 Id. at 542-46.
'84 Id. at 546.
185 Id. at 546-47.
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Although neither Smith nor Lukumi involved a dismissal for failure to satisfy
the threshold test, it is reasonably clear that the Court maintained the test in both these
cases. In both cases, the claimants were able to satisfy the test. The claimants in
Smith nevertheless lost their case because the Court applied a deferential standard
of review to the neutral laws at issue there; 86 but in Lukumi, the claimants prevailed
as the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down non-neutral laws.'87
However, in the Court's next major free exercise case, Locke v. Davey, the major-
ity opinion was relatively unclear as to whether the threshold test was satisfied and,
if it was, what standard of review the Court applied.'88
1m1. THE THRESHOLD TEST IN LOCKE V. DAVEY
When a government engages in intentional religious discrimination against a
religious practitioner who can satisfy the threshold test under the Free Exercise
Clause, courts must strictly scrutinize such arrangements. The Smith Court said this
in dicta,'89 and the holding in Lukumi affirmed this understanding. 9 After these
two cases, the most promising ground for most litigants raising a First Amendment
challenge to state-imposed burdens on religious exercise was to assert that the state's
actions were not neutral or generally applicable. At least some lower courts seemed
open to giving such claims serious consideration.'
Eleven years after Lukumi, the case of Locke v. Davey presented the Supreme
Court of the United States with an assertion of that kind, alleging that a state had
adopted an intentionally discriminatory policy that should be judged under strict
186 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
187 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47.
"88 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
189 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("[T]he 'exercise of
religion' often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service .... It would be
true, we think,... that a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought
to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display." (emphasis added)); id. at 878 (rejecting
claimants' contention that "their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond
the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice" (emphasis
added)); id. at 886 n.3 ("Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classi-
fications based on race, or on the content of speech, so too we strictly scrutinize governmental
classifications based on religion.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
'90 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
19' See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a police department's rule generally forbidding the
wearing of beards by officers after finding the rule's selective exemptions to be indicative
of discriminatory intent); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996) (applying strict
scrutiny to invalidate a housing rule at a state university after finding that the rule was not
neutral or generally applicable).
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scrutiny."9 The policy at issue was a scholarship program established by the State of
Washington, and the claimant alleged that the state had denied him funding on an
equal basis with other recipients because of his exercise of his religious beliefs.
19 3
A. Facts and Resolution of Davey
The Promise Scholarship Program was established by state statute in order to
provide financial aid to help certain graduates of Washington high schools pay the
costs of attending college in the State of Washington. 194 The statute limited benefi-
ciaries along some secular lines: to be eligible, students were required to meet certain
minimum requirements as to prior academic performance and financial need, and were
required to enroll "'at least half time in an eligible postsecondary institution in the
state of Washington."" 95 Washington's public post-secondary schools would qualify
as "eligible" institutions, 196 but so would any private post-secondary school in the
state, whether religious or secular, as long as the school was accredited by a nationally
recognized accrediting body.'97 Importantly, however, the state statutes imposed one
other limitation on student recipients: during any year in which scholarship funds
were received, the student must not be "pursuing a degree in theology."' 98 The term
"degree in theology" was not defined by law, 99 but the Court determined that as the
state actually enforced the policy, each recipient's school, rather than the state, de-
termined whether that recipient was pursuing such a degree, and each school with a
Promise Scholarship student was required to certify to the state whether the student
was in compliance with the undefined legal command.2 "0
192 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
191 Id. at 715-18.
1" Id. at 715-16; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315)
(citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(a) (2004) (making scholarships available only
to graduates of public or private high schools located within the state of Washington)).
191 Davey, 540 U.S. at 716 (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(f) (2003)).
'96 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 194, at 7 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-
020(13) (2003)).
"9 Davey, 540 U.S. at 716 (citing § 250-80-020(13) (2003)).
198 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2003); WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 28B. 10.814
(West 1997); see Davey, 540 U.S. at 716-17.
'9 Davey, 540 U.S. at 716.
200 Id. at 717 (citing Joint Appendix at 126, 131, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315)); see
also Davey, 540 U.S. at 717 n. 1 ("The State does not require students to certify anything or
sign any forms." (citing Joint Appendix, supra, at 86, 89)). By the time the case came to the
Supreme Court, the state had apparently stipulated that the policy prohibited scholarship recip-
ients from pursuing "degrees that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious
faith."' Davey, 540 U.S. at 716 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, supra note 194); see also id.
at 717 ("There is no dispute that the pastoral ministries degree is devotional and therefore
excluded under the Promise Scholarship Program."). But the "devotional" and "designed to
induce religious faith" modifiers did not appear in any law, and the Court did not seem to
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Joshua Davey was a graduate of a Washington high school who met the academic
and financial qualifications for a Promise Scholarship.20' He was also a Christian, a
member of the Foursquare Denomination. 202 He chose to attend college at a private
religious school in Washington called Northwest College, which was an "eligible
[post-secondary] institution" under the rules of the Promise Scholarship Program.2 3
Northwest College was affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination and ad-
vertised its "concept of education" as "distinctly Christian in the evangelical sense.
' 21
Davey chose Northwest for several reasons: its course offerings "would allow [him]
to fulfill [his] religious convictions regarding becoming a minister," it offered these
courses at "a very reasonable cost," it was located relatively near his hometown, and
it was affiliated with the "Assemblies of God Denomination, which holds tenets of
faith very similar to those held by the Foursquare Denomination."205
Davey chose to enroll full time at Northwest College, and also applied for and was
awarded a Promise Scholarship to fund his studies there.2" Upon enrollment, he im-
mediately declared a double major in pastoral ministries and business management/
administration. 2 7 While the record is unclear as to why he felt compelled to declare
any major immediately, he asserted that he chose to major in these areas instead of
others because he "believed that this combination of courses would best prepare
[him] for the complex... tasks that comprise contemporary Christian ministry. 208
However, after he had declared his majors and a few days after he had received
notice that he had been awarded a Promise Scholarship, he met with the Director of
Financial Aid at Northwest College, Ms. Walter, who informed him that according to
state law, the Promise Scholarship could not be used by students who are pursuing
place great weight on them, sometimes ignoring them altogether. See, e.g., id. at 725 n.9
('The State notes that it is an open question whether the Washington Constitution prohibits
nontheology majors from taking devotional theology courses. At this point, however, the
Program guidelines only exclude students who are pursuing a theology degree." (emphasis
added)). In noting the many ways Davey could pursue a course of study in devotional theology
while still receiving his scholarship, see id. at 724-25, and the state's interest in prohibiting
funding for clergy training, see id. at 721-23, the Court seemed to assume that the state's line
was effectively drawn, not based on whether courses or degrees were "devotional" in nature,
but rather on whether the name of a particular degree suggested that the degree was asso-
ciated with training for the ministry. In any case, as a practical matter, "devotional" (and even
"theology") clearly meant only whatever each college wanted it to mean. The Court explicitly
found that "[t]he [educational] institution, rather than the State, determines whether the student's
major is devotional." Id. at 717.
20 Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 41.
202 Id. at 40, 42.
203 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
204 Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 168.
205 Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 41-42.
206 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717; Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 42-44.
207 Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 43.
208 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 17:103
2008] THE CONTINUING THRESHOLD TEST FOR FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 135
a degree in theology.2°9 Although the state did not enforce this rule except by re-
quiring schools to certify that their Promise Scholarship students were obeying it,
210
apparently Northwest's policy was to require its Promise Scholarship students, as
a condition of receiving the state scholarship funds, to make the determination for
themselves by signing a separate "Condition of Award letter" indicating that they
were not pursuing a theology degree.2 1' Ms. Walter also testified, however, that she
personally believed that any Promise Scholarship student declaring a major within
Northwest's Department of Religious and Ministerial Studies (and the pastoral
ministries major was one of these) would not be eligible for the scholarship.212 The
day after Davey's meeting with Ms. Walter, at which he was first informed of the
prohibition on "pursuing a theology degree," his father "contacted the American
Center for Law and Justice and asked if that organization would be able to assist
[Davey]. ' ,213 Lawyers from that organization would later represent Davey in this
case before the U.S. Supreme Court.
2 14
Meanwhile, Davey testified, he was considering what to do.215 Two other Promise
Scholarship students at Northwest, facing the same situation at the same time as
Davey, changed their majors to "undeclared," and Ms. Walter testified that if Davey
had done this, he would have been eligible for the scholarship. 2 6 Northwest had no
rule requiring Davey or any other student to declare a major upon enrollment.2 7 But
ultimately, "[a]fter much pondering and prayer,"2 I8 Davey refused to modify either of
his two declarations of major and also refused to sign the Condition of Award letter,21 9
citing his desire to make a statement of protest, his uncertainty as to which degrees or
209 Davey, 540 U.S. at 717; Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 43-45, 59-62, 155-60.
210 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 86, 89, 126, 131.
21 Id. at 163-67.
212 Id. at 146-48, 155, 158, 162. However, she apparently allowed at least those students
who had not declared a major within that department to decide for themselves whether they
were "pursuing a degree in theology," and the school would then abide by that determination
in the school's certification to the state. Id. at 155-60.
213 Id. at 45.
214 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315); Docket U.S.
Supreme Court, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315) (posted March 11, 2003); Transcript of
Oral Argument at 28, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315).
215 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 46.
216 Id. at 142-43, 161-62.
217 Id. at 152.
211 Id. at 46.
219 Id. In light of Davey's refusal to reconsider his declaration of the pastoral ministries
major, his refusal to sign the letter might well have been a moot point. Ms. Walter testified that
at the time of her meeting with Davey she had regarded him as unqualified for the scholarship
due to his declaration of a major within the Department of Bible and Ministry, so his mere sign-
ing of the letter, without modifying his earlier declaration of the pastoral ministries major, might
not have caused her to certify that he was not pursuing a degree in theology. See id. at 142-43,
146-47, 155-58, 162.
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courses were allowed under the program, and his feeling that the scholarship pro-
gram was "simply imposing a back-door tax on religious believers, and I knew that
was wrong.""22 Davey also indicated that his "religious belief regarding truthfulness"
would be violated if he were to change his "course of study to a state-approved major,
with the intent of switching back to the forbidden major once [he] had exhausted [his]
Scholarship eligibility."22' Apparently he believed changing his "course of study"
in his freshman year while intending in his junior year to pursue a different "course
of study" would be a form of lying. However, this crisis of conscience may have
simply reflected Davey's misunderstanding of the Promise Scholarship Program; in
fact, he need not have changed his "course of study" in order to receive the scholar-
ship. The state's scholarship benefit was conditioned, not on his "course of study,"
but on whether he officially declared a particular major during a particular year of his
enrollment in school, which would in turn determine whether his school would certify
to the state that he was not currently "pursuing a degree in theology. 2 22 Ms. Walters
was prepared to make such a certification to the state without Davey' s changing his
"course of study," if Davey had simply declared his major in his freshman year to be
either "undeclared" or "business management/administration. ' '223
In any case, Davey was unwilling or unable to modify any of his declarations
of major. Davey continued at Northwest College and also insisted upon officially
declaring in his freshman year a pastoral ministries major in addition to his business
administration major. The school, in turn, refused to certify to the state that he was
not "pursuing a degree in theology," and pursuant to state law, Davey thus became
ineligible to receive a Promise Scholarship. 224 Davey responded by filing a lawsuit
alleging that the Promise Scholarship Program had violated his constitutional right
to free exercise of religion.225
The Court upheld the program, but its precise rationale was unclear.22 6 Overall,
the Court saw the scholarship program as operating in a permissive area between
the commands of the Establishment Clause and those of the Free Exercise Clause,
an area the Court referred to as the "'play in the joints"' between the two clauses.227
In other words, the Free Exercise Clause does not require states to do everything the
Establishment Clause allows them to do, such as granting scholarships to students
who pursue theology degrees; there is some room between the clauses in which states
are allowed to choose either option A or option B. Thus Washington was free under
220 Id. at 46-47.
221 Id. at 46. The state had announced that a student who received a Promise Scholarship
for one academic year could renew it for only one additional academic year. See id. at 50.
222 See supra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
223 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 155-60, 162.
224 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
225 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717-18 (2004).
226 Id. at 725.
227 Id. at 718-19, 725 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
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the Establishment Clause, if it so desired, to pay for students to obtain theology
degrees as well as other degrees within its larger scholarship program,22 8 but the Free
Exercise Clause did not require such funding if Washington chose instead to ex-
clude students pursuing theology degrees.22 9 It will quickly be seen, however, that
this "holding" merely obscures the central question: What convinced the Court that
this was a "play in the joints" case? Why, in other words, did Washington's choice
of "option B" not violate the Free Exercise Clause? The answer is not completely
clear, but the Court's rationale for denying Davey' s free exercise claim seemed to rest
on its conclusion that the Promise Scholarship Program exhibited no "animus" toward
religion.23 ° This conclusion, in turn, rested on two primary considerations: the impor-
tance of Washington's interest in not funding the training of clergy, and the "relatively
minor burden" Washington had imposed on Davey's religious freedoms.'
The Court presented these two primary considerations as its twofold response
to the argument that Washington had impermissibly singled out religion for unfa-
vorable treatment. Davey's chief argument was that the state's exclusion of students
who were pursuing theology degrees was "presumptively unconstitutional because
it is not facially neutral with respect to religion." 232 Davey argued that Washington's
scholarship program was analogous to the governmental action struck down in
Lukumi, in which the city passed ordinances forbidding the "sacrifice of any animal"
in a "private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption."
233
In both cases, Davey urged, the government was singling out religion for especially
bad treatment, and thus Washington should not be allowed to avail itself of the pre-
sumption, announced in Smith, favoring neutral, generally applicable laws.23 ' The
Court, however, did not see the two cases as analogous. Whereas the city in Lukumi
228 Id. at 719. This conclusion, as the Court noted, was compelled by the holding of Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (upholding, against an Establishment Clause
challenge, a state program which allowed parents to use state funds to pay for children's
education at a public, private secular, or private religious school of the parents' choice).
229 Davey, 540 U.S. at 718-19, 725.
230 See id. at 720-21, 725.
231 See id. at 721 ('That a State would deal differently with religious education for the
ministry than with education for other callings is a product of [its anti-establishment] views,
not evidence of hostility toward religion."); id. at 724 ("Far from evincing the hostility toward
religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship
Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits."); id. at 725 (concluding
the opinion by stating that "[w]ithout a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey's claim
must fail. The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial
and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here." (emphasis added)).
232 Id. at 720.
233 See id. (Davey's argument); supra notes 166-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the facts and holding in Lukumi).
234 Brief for Respondent, supra note 214, at 17-20.
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had sought to suppress one particular faith by writing criminal laws and then exempt-
ing from punishment everything except that faith's religious ritual, Washington's
"disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind."23 5 For one thing,
as the Court would note again later, the burden Washington imposed on religious stu-
dents was slight by comparison; 6 for another, because constitutions across the country
have always treated religion in a unique way-favoring free exercise but opposing
establishment-it is understandable that a state would want to exclude religion in
its funding programs, and such exclusion is not in itself a reason to suspect that the
state is hostile to religion.237
The first point, about the minor burden on religious students, appears at the be-
ginning and end of the opinion, with the second point about the state's interest sand-
wiched in between.238 Much of this middle "state interest" section is devoted to a
survey of American history, noting the several instances in which various Founding
Fathers and states had supported some rule forbidding distributions of tax dollars
to support the clergy.239 The Court concluded from this that Washington's interest
in forbidding the use of tax dollars for religious training, while not compelled by the
Establishment Clause, was at least understandable and did not suggest hostility toward
religion.24 The Court bookended this discussion, however, by emphasizing and then
re-emphasizing the "relatively minor burden" the exclusion imposed on Davey' s exer-
cise of his religious beliefs.24 Early in the opinion the Court noted that Washington's
law did not impose civil or criminal sanctions on any religious activity, did not deny
any political participation rights of the religious, and did not, like the laws in the un-
employment compensation cases, "require students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit."'242 And later, after discussing the state's
interest, the Court noted that Washington's program allowed scholarship recipients
to attend "pervasively religious schools" that include religious training even in non-
theology courses, and also to take as many "devotional theology courses" as they
wished.243 Washington allowed Promise Scholarship recipients to take any courses
they chose; the scholarship was not conditioned on the student's choice of courses, but
upon his choice of declared major. "In short," the Court concluded, "we find neither
235 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
236 See id. at 720-21, 724-25 (noting the minimal burden on religion).
237 Id. at 721.
238 See id. at 720-21,724-25 (noting the minimal burden on religion); id. at 721-23 (noting
the state interest in avoiding establishments).
239 Id. at 721-23.
240 Id. at 721,723.
241 Supra note 231; supra note 236 and accompanying text.
242 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720-21. This standard also recalls the line the Court drew in Roy
and Lyng for establishing a burden on free exercise rights. See supra notes 115-16, 120, 124,
126 and accompanying text.
243 Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25.
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in the history or text of... the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the
Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion." 2"
Hence the Court denied Davey's claim and upheld the exclusion contained in the
Promise Scholarship Program.
B. Reaction to Davey
Many have seen this decision as unfaithful to Smith and Lukumi, and a further
erosion of religious liberties. This follows from their conclusion that the Promise
Scholarship Program did indeed target religion for disfavored treatment. Justice
Scalia, the author of Smith, made this his major argument as he dissented in Davey:
"[The various] opinions [in Lukumi] are irreconcilable with today's decision....
[The] State of Washington has.., created a generally available public benefit [and]
has then carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion: theology.... No field
of study but religion is singled out for disfavor in this fashion." '24 5 Later in his
opinion he put the point even more forcefully: "Let there be no doubt: This case
is about discrimination against a religious minority."246 Several commentators have
agreed.247 Douglas Laycock lamented: "There was no subtlety to the discrimination
in the Washington State Promise Scholarships.... This was discrimination under
any understanding of discrimination.... Davey's claim appeared to be a slam dunk
under Lukumi. And yet it lost, 7-2. "248 Philip Manns concluded that "[t]he target-
ing of devotional theology for sole exclusion from the Promise Scholarship Program
violated the anti-targeting-of-religion principle of the Free Exercise Clause (in
Lukumi and McDaniel) .... 249 Similarly, Richard Duncan reasoned that "[s]ince
the Promise Scholarship Program facially targeted devotional theology majors for
discriminatory exclusion from funding, Davey's free exercise claim should have
been an easy and certain winner under Smith and Lukumi.
250
Regardless of whether Davey can be reconciled with Smith and Lukumi, it is at least
difficult to view Davey as any sort of enhancement of free exercise rights, and many
believe it effectively grants permission for states to exclude the religious from other-
wise generally available public funds-especially, perhaps, funds that take the form
of educational vouchers for primary and secondary schools.251 Some commentators
244 Id. at 725.
245 Id. at 726-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 733.
247 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
248 Laycock, supra note 10, at 171-73.
249 Manns, supra note 10, at 693.
250 Duncan, supra note 10, at 705.
251 See, e.g., Alan Trammell, Note, The Cabining of Rosenberger: Locke v. Davey and
the Broad Nondiscrimination Principle That Never Was, 92 VA. L. REV. 1957,2018-19(2006);
Laura S. Underkuffler, Davey and the Limits of Equality, 40 TULSA L. REv. 267,268 (2004);
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have also noted that Davey might negate the argument that under certain circum-
stances faith-based programs providing social services are entitled under the Free
Exercise Clause to equally share in receipt of government grants.252
C. An Alternative Understanding of Davey
While it is certainly possible to read Davey as having such broad-and disturbing-
implications, it need not be read that way. The opinion does not necessarily further
restrict religious liberty, nor must it affect, by and large, subsequent free exercise chal-
lenges to government funding programs of various sorts. A less expansive reading
of Davey would suggest that the Davey Court did not significantly change the law;
rather, the Court was applying a free exercise doctrine which predates and was not
questioned by Smith, and the holding in Davey was largely confined to its own facts.
The opinion gives several indications that the result in Davey should probably
be viewed as having only limited application elsewhere. First, the Davey Court it-
self was careful to point out that the portion of Washington's constitution at issue
in Davey was not a so-called "Blaine amendment., 253 The purpose of this denial,
no doubt, was to signal a narrow ruling that would not determine the validity of the
"Blaine amendments" existing in many other state constitutions. The Court side-
stepped arguments about these provisions, which were concurrently being invoked
Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking It Out of Neutral: The Application of Locke's Substantial
Interest Test to the School Voucher Debate, 62 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1271, 1287-95 (2005);
supra note 12 and accompanying text. It is clear from the questions raised at oral argument
in Davey that before the case was decided or the opinion written, at least a few members of the
Court were concerned that their decision in this case might affect future free exercise challenges
to exclusionary school voucher programs. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 214, at
4, 21, 31-40, 52-54. Of course these concerns were voiced before the case was decided, so
it is unclear whether the concerned Justices ultimately viewed the majority opinion as having
such an effect. In other words, it is possible that those Justices were able to join the majority
opinion only because they believed that, as written, the opinion would have minimal prece-
dential effects on future funding cases.
252 See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Of Government Funding, Religious Institutions, and
Neutrality: Seeing the Charitable-Choice Debate Through the Lens ofArrow's Impossibility
Theorem, 40 TULSA L. REv. 321, 323-24 (2004).
253 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 715, 723 n.7 (2004). The term "Blaine amendment" is used
to refer to state constitutional provisions that forbid any state public education funds from
coming under the control of any religious sect. The term is named after Congressman James
G. Blaine, who in 1875 proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would so
limit the states. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OFCHURCH AND STATE 297-98,298 n.28,
324-25, 335 (2002). Some have contested the Court's conclusion about Washington's con-
stitutional provision, claiming that Washington's constitution was significantly influenced
by Blaine's proposed amendment. See, e.g., Mark Edward DeForrest, Locke v. Davey: The
Connection Between the Federal Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11 of the Washington
State Constitution, 40 TULSA L. REv. 295 (2004).
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in the states to defeat various school voucher proposals and were being challenged by
voucher supporters as violations of free exercise rights.254 Beyond this, the Davey
opinion is narrowly constrained in another obvious way: it announces no legal rule
for deciding future questions involving governmental funding programs that exclude
the religious. Instead, the Court explicitly states only that this program falls within the
"play in the joints," and that the Court "need not venture further into this difficult area
in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State
of Washington."255 The opinion does contain, it is true, some affirmation of the states'
interest in refusing to fund theological studies, indicating that states will not be
presumed to be hostile to religion solely because they adopt such exclusions in their
funding programs. 6 But whatever this might mean for other state programs, the
implications are tempered by the Court's frequent reliance on the particulars of
Washington's Promise Scholarship Program and its minimal burden on the
religious257 Moreover, in this hotly contested free exercise case in which numerous
amici participated on both sides, only two Justices did not sign on to the majority
opinion in Davey-a strange outcome indeed, if the Justices in the majority saw their
ruling as widely applicable beyond the facts of this case to many other kinds of
government funding programs. The Court's most recent prior case involving religion
and government funding-an Establishment Clause challenge to a voucher
program--had only two years earlier resulted in a divisive 5-4 ruling and many
separate opinions by the Justices.258
The broadest language in the majority opinion is contained in the middle section
addressing state interest and history, but it should be noted that the Court was
perhaps on its weakest ground in this section.259 As it made its point about the
strength of Washington's interest in excluding religion from funding, the Court
drew primarily upon its survey of American history, noting several instances in
which various Founding Fathers and states had supported some rule forbidding
distributions of tax dollars to support the clergy.26 Yet most or all of these in-
stances involved opposition to proposals to distribute benefits only to the clergy (or
particular clergy), schemes that would evince more state favoritism toward religion
than did Davey's proposal that religion merely be included in a much larger
254 For a brief summary of the school voucher debate in the context of the state Blaine
amendments, see Underkuffler, supra note 251, at 268.
2" Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
256 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Davey, 540 U.S. at 725 ("Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey's
claim must fail. The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of theology degrees is substantial
and the exclusion ofsuch funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here." (emphasis added)).
258 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 721-23.
260 See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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benefits program.26' And to the extent certain founders and states may have occa-
sionally supported rules to exclude the clergy from generally available state
benefits, those rules themselves raise the precise free exercise question Davey
raised, and the Supreme Court had not directly decided that question. If anything,
as Justice Scalia noted in dissent, the Court's holding in McDaniel v. Paty262 had
implied that states may not exclude the clergy from generally available rights or
benefits.263
The Court made other questionable arguments in this section, too. For example,
the Court contended that states are not showing hostility to religion when they fund
all types of education except religious education, because states have unique con-
stitutional duties in this arena to balance the protection of free exercise against the
prevention of religious establishment. 264 But those unique duties are not obviously
implicated in Davey' s case, because the Court declared it to be a "play in thejoints"
case in which Washington had the option to include theology degrees or to exclude
them.265 Neither free exercise principles nor disestablishment principles dictated one
choice or the other. If the state had the option, its particular choice cannot have been
dictated by the need to walk a fine line. The Court acknowledged that the Establishment
Clause did not require Washington to exclude theology degrees.266 Thus Washington's
choice to exclude them cannot be said to stem from its constitutional duty to oppose
religious establishments. 267 Nor does Washington's exclusion find much support from
the Court's recounting of history, as the history lacks clear examples of denials to
clergy of a generally available benefit.268 In sum, the Court's opinion provides little
reason to think that Washington had an especially good reason to exclude religion
from its scholarship program.
A more promising support for the decision to deny Davey's claim, however, is
found in the Court's emphasis on the "relatively minor burden" the exclusion imposed
on Davey's exercise of his religious beliefs.2 69 This language of "burden" reminds one
immediately of the threshold test for free exercise claims, which requires claimants
261 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that a state law disqualifying "ministers" and "priest[s]"
from holding certain public offices violated the Free Exercise Clause).
263 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 732-33, 733 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
265 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 718-19.
266 Id. at 719. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
267 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 730 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268 See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
269 See Davey, 540 U.S. at 725; see also id. at 720-21 (noting that any "disfavor"
Washington showed to religion was "far milder" than that shown in Lukumi because the state
had not imposed "criminal [or] civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite," it had
not denied political participation rights to ministers, and it had not "require[d] students to
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit").
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to set forth a prima facie case of a burden on free exercise rights.270 The Court's
language surely reflects a concern about whether Davey had satisfied the threshold
test, and logically this concern is precedent to any analysis of the state's justifications
for its law. For if a claimant fails to satisfy the threshold test, the Court has no reason
to scrutinize the law orconsider whether the state's justifications are weighty enough.27'
The Court in Davey did not explicitly apply any particular standard of scrutiny, lend-
ing support to the idea that the Court weeded out the claim at the threshold level
rather than proceeding to the subsequent step of applying a standard of scrutiny. The
Court's detour addressing the state's burden undercuts that conclusion somewhat;
but as noted above, the reasoning in that section seems strained,272 and the section is
framed on both sides by evidences of the minimal burden.273 Most importantly, the
discussion of state interest is unnecessary to the result, the more so since the Court
never said whether any particular level of state interest was necessary or in what con-
texts a "substantial" state interest would be sufficient. Davey had not shown a suf-
ficient burden on the exercise of his sincere religious beliefs. Under the Court's free
exercise precedents, therefore, the Court need not have proceeded to consider the
justifiability of the law or significance of the state interest; rather, we would expect
the case to be over after the Court decided as a preliminary matter that Davey did not
state a prima facie case." Precedent would suggest that the Court's finding regarding
the insignificance of Davey' s burden could have been conclusive by itself.
Perhaps, then, the rejection of Davey's claim is best understood as an application
of the threshold test. The test is supported by a long line of precedent.275 There have
been small variations on this test at the margins. Sometimes the Court has suggested
that the burden must be "substantial" or "significant." '276 Moreover, since Roy and
Lyng, the Court has interpreted the burden prong to require claimants to show that the
state policy tended to induce or coerce the claimants to violate their religious be-
liefs.277 But the test remains, and neither Smith nor Lukumi purported to modify or
question it.
278
270 See supra Part I.
271 See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378,
391-92 (1990); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-06
(1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403-09 (1963).
272 See supra text accompanying 260-68.
273 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
274 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
275 See supra Part I.
276 See, e.g., Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391 (rejecting claimant's challenge on ground that "any
such burden is not constitutionally significant"); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) ("The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on
the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling govem-
mental interest justifies the burden.").
277 See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
278 See supra Part II.
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The Court's conclusion that Davey's burden was "minor"'2 79 or "milder" 280 sug-
gests a determination that Davey failed the threshold test by failing to show that the
state had substantially burdened the exercise of his sincere religious beliefs. In con-
sidering Davey's claim that Washington had singled out religion for persecution, the
Court noted that Washington's scholarship program did not impose civil or criminal
sanctions on any religious activity and did not deny any political participation rights
of the religious.28' These factors would not necessarily defeat Davey's claim, however;
the same factors were present in some claims that had succeeded before the Court,
such as the claims in the unemployment compensation cases, in which claimants were
excluded from generally available benefits due to their exercise of some religious be-
lief they held.282 But importantly, the Court also distinguished Davey' s claim from the
unemployment compensation cases by noting that Washington's scholarship exclusion
did not "require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit. '283 The Promise Scholarship was clearly a government benefit,
which students could not receive if they declared a major in pastoral ministries.284
Thus the Court must have determined that Davey' s religious beliefs did not compel
him to declare a major in pastoral ministries in his freshman year.
If this is what the Court decided, there is ample ground in the record to support
that determination. Davey asserted that he believed changing his "course of study"
in his freshman year while intending in his junior year to pursue a different "course
of study" would be equivalent to lying to the state.285 However, the state's scholarship
benefit depended, not on his "course of study," but on what major he officially de-
clared during a particular year of his enrollment in school. 6 And crucially, the state
did not require him to declare a secular major as a condition of receiving benefits.
He certainly could have received the scholarship while pursuing his desired "course
of study," in the sense that he could have taken all of his desired course work, taught
from a Christian viewpoint.287 All that the state required in effect was that he wait
until his junior year, at which time his scholarship eligibility would have expired,288
to officially declare his pastoral ministries major. As another alternative, he could
have done in his freshman year what other Promise Scholarship students did and de-
clare his major to be "undeclared," a term which surely would not have been a lie.289
279 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2003).
280 Id. at 720.
28' Id.
282 See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
283 Davey, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
284 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 163-67.
2 Id. at 46.
8 See id. at 142-43, 152-62, supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 198-200, 243 and accompanying text.
'88 See supra note 221.
289 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 142-43, 155-62.
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Either of these alternatives would have satisfied the state's requirements while also
allowing him to maintain his scholarship-all without delaying his training, changing
his course work, denying his plans to become a minister, or deceptively declaring a
major he did not intend to obtain. Perhaps he believed he would be lying if he signed
a statement indicating that he did not plan to "pursue a degree in theology"; but the
state, at any rate, did not require him to make such an assertion or sign any statement
in order to receive the scholarship.2 90 The state merely required an affirmation from
the school, not the student, stating that the Promise Scholarship students enrolled at
that school were not currently pursuing a degree in theology. 9' The record indicates
that Ms. Walter would have signed this statement as to Davey if Davey had declared
that he was not declaring a major at this time, without any other affirmative statement
from Davey whatsoever.292 In other words, the record shows that Davey could have
remained silent and kept his scholarship, and the state had no objection to that. What
the record does not demonstrate, though, is that Davey' s religious beliefs compelled
him to do the one thing that would revoke his benefits: declaring a theology-related
major in his freshman year.
In the face of other options that do not seem to involve deception of others or
modification of his plans for religious training, the Court may well have doubted
that Davey lost his scholarship as a result of doing something actually required or
taught by his religious beliefs. Certainly a distinction can be made along these lines
between Davey and the unemployment benefits claimants, such as Ms. Sherbert. Ms.
Sherbert, as a Seventh-day Adventist, felt religiously compelled to rest on Saturdays,
and this is why she lost her job and ultimately her state benefit.293 Davey gave sev-
eral religiously grounded reasons why he felt he could not change his course of study
or declare a major he did not intend to obtain;294 but the state did not require him to
do these things as a condition of receiving benefits. The state statutes said scholar-
ships were not available if the student was "pursuing a degree in theology." '295 But
as actually administered, the state's requirement was merely that Davey not declare,
during his freshman year, a major in a field that his school considered "theology."
He never clearly stated whether, or why, his religious beliefs required him to do this.
The closest he came to such a statement was his somewhat ambiguous, unsupported
assertion that ". . . my religious beliefs require me to pursue a degree in Pastoral
Ministries .... ,,296 But "pursuing" that "degree" would not have caused him to lose
benefits, as long as he did not officially declare the major until his junior year. All
290 See supra notes 199-200, 221-23 and accompanying text.
291 Id.
292 See Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 142-43, 155-62.
293 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 198.
296 Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 46.
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he needed to do was remain silent. This is what he was unwilling or unable to do. Far
from showing that his refusal to remain silent was due to religious beliefs, the record
suggests that it was rooted in his desire to make "a statement of protest against the
state officials' discriminatory act" '297 and "a statement of protest on ... behalf' of
"people of faith" who might be victims of "such coercive discrimination" by the
state.298 But protests can be effectively aired in other venues. The purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause is not to provide a judicial forum for airing worthy protests; it is to
prevent the state from imposing burdens (after Smith, discriminatory burdens) on sin-
cere religious belief. More pointedly, the Court has said that the Clause is enforced
in order to provide relief for those who have no choice, because of their religion, but
to violate the law.299 Davey, it seems, had options. He could have been faithful to his
religious beliefs without losing his scholarship if he had been less insistent on this
particular method of filing a protest.
In fact, aside from his desire to protest, Davey listed only two other reasons for
his insistence on declaring a pastoral ministries major: (1) he did not understand
what courses or majors were allowed under the scholarship rules; and (2) he "knew
[it] was wrong" for the state to be "simply imposing a back-door tax on religious
believers .... ."" The first reason, his confusion about the state's rules, might suffice
to explain an accidental violation of the scholarship rules; it is not a reason to inten-
tionally disobey, and in any event it is not a religious reason. °1 The second reason,
though, seems to be merely a reworded version of the "need for protest" reason:
Davey claimed that he had a religious belief that the exclusion of theology degrees
was "wrong," and thus he felt compelled to declare his intent to obtain one.3°2 But his
compulsion to act does not necessarily or obviously follow from his stated religious
belief. If the state had excluded only degrees in Old Testament, and he believed the
exclusion "wrong," would he have felt compelled to declare his intent to obtain one
of those as well? Unless his religion teaches that he should flagrantly disobey every
rule he believes is "wrong"-a contention that nowhere appears in the record-this
reason seems to be merely another way of saying he wanted to express his disapproval
of the state's wrongdoing.
So all of Davey's reasons for insisting on an early declaration of a certain major
boil down to his desire to protest the state's unfairness and his confusion about what
his alternatives were. In short, on this record the Court could easily have determined
297 Id. at 55-56.
298 Id. at 56.
299 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
'0o Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 47.
301 In fact, if Davey really thought he did not know what the rules allowed him to study,
it is very unclear why his conscience would demand that he declare a clearly forbidden major
and sue the state rather than trying to find out whether his religiously required course of study
was in fact forbidden by the state.
'02 Joint Appendix, supra note 200, at 47.
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that none of Davey's asserted reasons stated a religious belief that would be violated
by declaring a major of "undeclared," or business administration alone, in his fresh-
man year of college.
Admittedly, there is a fine line between applying the threshold test and engaging
in the sorts of inquiries into a claimant's creed and logic that the Court has forbidden.
As early as Ballard, the Court cautioned against inquiring into the truth of asserted
religious beliefs and noted that the inquiry should be directed at determining only
whether the claimants sincerely believed. 3 Beyond this, the Court noted in Thomas
that free exercise claims should not depend on ajudge's determination of whether the
claimed beliefs are "acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others., '3°4
Yet in the same opinion, the Court affirmed that the threshold test must still be
applied: "The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine
whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because
of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion."' 5 In Davey's
case, then, the Court's function was to determine whether there was an appropriate
finding that Davey declared a forbidden major in his freshman year because of an
honest conviction that such action was compelled by his religion (or an honest con-
viction that he was forbidden by his religion from doing otherwise). In making such
judgments, there is of course a danger that judges may go too far, essentially invali-
dating claims based upon their own religious bigotry or ignorance. On the other hand,
if the threshold test is to have any meaning, it cannot stand merely for the proposition
that claimants must artfully plead. If a claimant can show a burden on the exercise of
sincere religious belief merely by stating that such a burden exists, then the threshold
test means nothing at all. Applying the threshold test, then, is a judicial balancing
act in which judges attempt to impose a serious threshold test without critiquing the
religious beliefs invoked.
But that sort of balancing act is nothing new in the free exercise area. While rec-
ognizing the danger of overreaching, the Court has consistently applied the threshold
test in free exercise claims and required claimants to show evidence that their sincere
religious beliefs are burdened. Hence in Hernandez, although the Court refused to
decide whether the claimants' beliefs were "central" to their faith or to question the
claimants' interpretations of doctrine, it nevertheless doubted that they had demon-
strated a cognizable burden.3" They alleged that their religious beliefs required atten-
dance at certain Scientology counseling sessions and the payment of "fixed donations"
for these sessions, and that refusing them a charitable deduction for such payments
burdened these religious exercises.307 The Court did not doubt their claims that
303 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
0 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employee Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
'0' Id. at 716.
'06 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
107 Id. at 685-86.
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religion compelled the attendance and the payments, but questioned whether their
religion prohibited them from doing the act required by the law: paying taxes on
those amounts."' Again, in Swaggart, although the claimants asserted that their
religious beliefs compelled them to sell religious materials such as Bibles and
sermons, the Court rejected their free exercise claim upon a finding that they had
not shown any religious belief forbidding what the state actually required, which
was the payment of sales and use taxes related to these items. 309 And in Alamo,
despite the claimants' assertions that their religious beliefs prohibited the payment
of wages and compensation of workers in the form of cash or checks, the Court
found that the claimants had failed adequately to show that minimum wage and
overtime laws burdened the exercise of their sincere religious beliefs. 3 " The
Court's finding was rooted in the fact that the Court could imagine alternatives that
would satisfy the law and not clearly conflict with the claimants' stated religious
views.3 ' In particular, the Court noted two alternatives that the claimants had not
explored: (1) the religious organization could continue paying compensation in
forms other than cash or check while also complying with legal requirements to give
a certain value of compensation and keep records of it; and (2) the workers could,
without violating any law, return all the compensation to the organization and thus
comply with their religion's prohibition on wages.312 While the Court has con-
stantly rejected the notion thatjudges should require a claimant's faith to be logical,
these cases illustrate the permissibility of a certain amount of judicial inquiry into
the claimants' beliefs and the alternatives available to them consistent with those
beliefs. In other words, merely stating some religious belief tangentially related to
the burden imposed by the state's regulation is not enough.
The parallels between Alamo and Davey are striking. Davey's asserted religious
beliefs in the importance of honesty and the need to train for the ministry were only
tangentially related to the scholarship requirements as actually enforced, which merely
prohibited him from declaring a certain type of major in his freshman year. The Court
seems to have accepted for purposes of argument that Davey held sincere religious
beliefs that he needed to enter the ministry and study theology. The Court also likely
accepted his claim that his religious beliefs prohibited deception. It is not the prov-
ince ofjudges to question whether any of those beliefs themselves are rational. But
a judge may rightly question whether any deception would have happened here if
Davey had chosen a different option." And ajudge may rightly question whether
3 Id. at 699.
" Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 382-84,
391-92 (1990).
3 " Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-05 (1985).
3" Id. at 303-04.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 303-05 (1985).
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Davey would have been hindered in his pursuit of training for the ministry by not declar-
ing a pastoral ministries major immediately upon enrollment. Similarly, the Court
in Alamo did not question the rationality of the claimants' religious aversion to
paying wages, but the Court did question whether "wages" would in fact have been
paid if the claimants had chosen a different option. Like the Alamo claimants, Davey
never satisfactorily demonstrated why he could not satisfy the demands of both the state
law and his religious beliefs simultaneously. That is what the threshold test requires.
If this is the true ground of the Court's decision in Davey, then Justice Scalia's
criticisms in dissent lose much of their force. Justice Scalia' s primary argument was
that the scholarship exclusion must be struck down under Lukumi because the scholar-
ship program discriminated against religion on its face.314 But no matter how facially
discriminatory the law, free exercise claimants must still make a prima facie showing
of a burden on the exercise of their own sincere religious beliefs; otherwise the Court
may be resolving disputes that are not real, relieving claimants who essentially have
no standing. If Davey was unable to make out a prima facie case, the Court would be
unable to overturn the exclusion in Washington's law, because the law did not really
interfere with Davey's practice of his religion.
Justice Scalia disputed the majority's contention that Davey's burden was mini-
mal.315 But he may betray a misunderstanding of the majority's burden argument
when he characterizes it as an argument that the "material consequences [of the law]
are not severe. 3 6 The majority's conclusion that the exclusion imposed a "rela-
tively minor burden" was more than an assertion about material consequences, such
as how much more money Davey would have to pay for his education.3 17 In context,
it is rather an assertion about how little the state's exclusion conflicted with Davey's
religious beliefs. It was not only, or primarily, an assertion about the burden on his
wallet, but about the burden on his religious beliefs. Justice Scalia, perhaps misunder-
standing this distinction, responded to the majority's argument in part by noting the
significance of the dollar amount involved.318 But in a separate response, he made the
somewhat novel assertion that "discrimination on the face of a statute" which results
in one's "being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling"
always causes substantial harm; "[tihe indignity... is so profound that the concrete
harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial."3 9 This may or may not be
true, but the prior question is whether Washington's scholarship program in fact
"singled [anyone] out for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling."32
314 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315 Id. at 731-32.
316 Id. at 731.
317 Id. at 725 (majority opinion).
318 Id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
319 Id. at 731.
320 id.
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True, the word "theology" appears on the face of the statute, but that hardly com-
pels the conclusion that the state was singling out the truly religious. The question
is always how the law is being enforced.
In the actual case, the exclusion as enforced did not come close to singling out
the very religious and only the very religious. Justice Scalia claimed that the state
had discriminated against a "religious minority," which he defined as the deeply
religious, "those whose belief in their religion is so strong that they dedicate their
study and their lives to its ministry."' 32 ' That delineation of the deeply religious is
surely contestable, and furthermore it does not address the class that the Promise
Scholarship Program actually excluded.
When one considers the nature of the exclusion that was actually enforced by
Washington, it is difficult to argue that the state had singled out those who are
deeply religious, or even those who desire to enter the full-time ministry. The state
program was so poorly conceived and enforced that it was hardly restrictive at all,
and it certainly did not effectively serve the state's stated interest in refusing to
subsidize all ministerial training. Justice Scalia thus misunderstood the Davey case
in two ways. First, although the state denied funding to those who declared theol-
ogy majors, the state did not in practice deny funding to students who wished to
dedicate their studies and lives to religious ministry, as Justice Scalia contended.
As the program was actually enforced, career plans did not affect a student's
eligibility for the scholarships one whit. And as the majority noted, the state was
perfectly willing to pay for all the ministerial training one could desire; the scholar-
ship could be used to pay for any and all theological studies, including classes that
were devotional in nature or designed to induce religious belief.322 The state would
withhold funds only when the student declared early in his or her collegiate career
an intent, not to enter a certain profession, but to obtain a particular kind of degree.
Second, the state did not draw lines based on the depth of anyone's religious
convictions. Justice Scalia rather casually asserted a connection between deep
religious devotion and the desire to enter full-time ministry; but this connection is
far from self-evident.323 More importantly, whatever the merits of that contention,
there is no strong or necessary correlation between the strength of one's religious
beliefs and one's desire to declare a theology major early in college, which is the
choice the state actually penalized. Many of the deeply devout surely will not
receive post-secondary education at all, and many of the devout who do will surely
choose other degrees and even other careers.324 Of those deeply religious students
321 Id. at 733.
322 Id. at 724 (majority opinion).
" Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324 The assumption that the most devout will become members of the clergy-that the most
deeply religious will choose to receive their paychecks from a religious group rather than from
an accounting firm, a construction firm, or an art gallery-may reflect a certain theological
understanding that divides the world into clergy, who are more deeply religious, and laity, who
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who do enter full-time ministry, many will never declare or obtain any theology degree,
and at least some deeply religious students who intend to obtain theology degrees will
not declare their major immediately. And of course some who choose a career in the
paid ministry, whether or not they attended college, are surely not so devout as others
outside the clergy. In short, whatever the state's asserted goals, the state did not in fact
draw lines based on whether one was training to enter full-time ministry; and it certainly
did not deny funding to the class of people who are especially religious.
Justice Scalia found McDaniel v. Paty35 incompatible with the result in Davey,326
but once again, if one assumes the Court rejected Davey's claim on the narrow thresh-
old ground, McDaniel can be easily reconciled with the Davey outcome. In McDaniel
the Court struck down a state constitutional provision prohibiting "ministers of the
gospel" and "priest[s]" from holding certain public offices.3 27 The claimant, a Baptist
minister, had alleged that the provision violated his right to free exercise of religion.32 s
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, clearly concluded that the law burdened
the minister's exercise of sincere religious beliefs.329 The burden was the denial of
political participation rights, and the religiously motivated act was the act, not of hold-
ing political office, but of being a minister.33 The plurality found that the disqualifi-
cation was not directed at beliefs as such, but "is directed primarily at status, acts, and
conduct. '33' In essence, the plurality found that the act of becoming or being a full-
time minister was a religiously motivated action, and that the state law had burdened
that action. This makes sense: Mr. McDaniel could undoubtedly show that he had
religious reasons for being a "minister," and according to the plurality, that was
exactly the act which the state had burdened by a denial of political participation
rights. In light of the clear burden on McDaniel's religious liberty, the state's prof-
fered interest-the need to maintain separation of church and state-was not suffi-
cient to justify the burden. But while "being a minister of the gospel" was exactly the
act burdened in McDaniel,332 it was not the act the state burdened in Davey. Neither
did the state burden the act of training to be a minister of the gospel. Rather, the state
are less deeply religious. Such a perspective sits comfortably with some religious traditions (for
example, Roman Catholicism), but is foreign to most Protestant evangelicals (a large group
including Davey himself), who tend to emphasize the priesthood of all believers and the holy
callings of even secular employment. For a general account of the disagreement on these issues
between the teachings of traditional Roman Catholicism and those of Martin Luther, see JOHN
WTE, JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE: LAW AND REUGION IN THE WESTERN TRADrION
53-58, 60-61 (2006).
325 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
326 Davey, 540 U.S. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621 n.1, 629 (plurality opinion).
328 Id. at 621.
329 Id. at 626-27.
330 See id.
331 Id. at 627.332 Id. at 620, 626-27.
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burdened the act of declaring a particular college major at a particular time. And
in light of the record, the Court had ample room to conclude that Davey's motives
for declaring a particular major at a particular time had more to do with a desire to
file a legal protest in a culture war than with practicing his religion according to his
sincere religious beliefs.
IV. THE VALUE OF THE THRESHOLD TEST
Davey illustrates the continuing vitality of the threshold test for free exercise
claims. As of now, the Court continues to require free exercise claimants to show,
as a threshold matter, how the state has burdened the exercise of their own sincerely
held religious beliefs. If they cannot do so, their claims cannot succeed.
In general, I think we should welcome the news that the threshold test is not going
away. Judicious enforcement of the threshold test does not significantly threaten reli-
gious liberties, and it protects the government from abuse. More particularly, it yields
greater fidelity to constitutional mandates and wiser use of judicial resources.
As a matter of fidelity to the Constitution, claims that cannot satisfy the threshold
test should not be cognizable. Perhaps it goes without saying, but it was surely not a
concern of the framers of the Free Exercise Clause to provide relief for those who were
not impeded by the state, or who were not really acting on their religious beliefs.333
Moreover, in the very text of the First Amendment, religious rights are delineated
by means of ambiguous and contentious words like "prohibiting" and "religion," in
effect demanding that judges define those terms.3 The threshold test does not add
to these judicial responsibilities; it simply requires judges to interpret and apply the
constitutional text more intentionally. Judges cannot decide whether a law has prohib-
ited the free exercise of religion without deciding which beliefs count as "religious,"
whether the claimant is lying about her beliefs, and whether her beliefs in fact caused
"exercise" that was in tension with the law. Any serious application of the Clause
thus requires that judges apply something very close to the threshold test at some
point. This should be understood as more than just a pleading requirement, although
it is that. Beyond the pleadings, courts have required, and should continue to require,
at least some minimal evidentiary support for claims that the state has burdened the
practice of a religion. As in so many areas of constitutional law, judicial discretion
cannot be completely removed; it is the duty of judges to exercise good judgment,
cognizant of the dangers of requiring too much of claimants, on the one hand, and re-
quiring too little, on the other. There is, of course, some danger here: careless judges
may go too far, requiring religious claims to be perfectly reasonable to the judge. But
running the risk of judicial overreaching is preferable to giving up and bowing out
of the inquiry altogether, adopting a rule that assumes the truth of every claimant's
333 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1486-88, 1493-99 (1990).
334 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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assertions as to religious beliefs, motivations, and burdens. For under that rule, the
text means nothing: the guarantee of free exercise of religion protects everything and
everyone-and therefore protects nothing and no one. To give cognizance to frivolous
claims of religious belief is to demean the whole notion that religion deserves-and
receives-special constitutional protection.
Besides encouraging obedience to the Constitution, the threshold test also per-
forms the useful function of conserving judicial resources by encouraging the peaceful
coexistence, where possible, of church and state. We should want to provide relief
for sincere claimants who truly feel trapped between the demands of two sovereigns,
religious and secular, but we should also want to avoid giving encouragement to those
who wear their religion as a chip on the shoulder, constantly goading the govern-
ment to try and knock it off. Claims by such people mock the plight of other religious
claimants who want nothing more than to be left alone to practice their religion equally
and in peace. Judicious enforcement of the threshold test does not deny relief to those
sincere believers who are truly trapped, but it encourages the confrontational to seek
ways to satisfy both God and Caesar. A due regard for limited judicial resources, as
well as societal peace, suggests that we should encourage such out-of-court solutions.
At the margins, judges may make mistakes in applying the threshold test,
weeding out some claims that should have been allowed to proceed. But at least
these mistakes may have less severe precedential consequences than other judicial
mistakes- for example, a mistake as to the importance of the asserted governmen-
tal interest. If the court wrongly concludes that a particular governmental interest
is important or compelling-or if the court wrongly concludes that a law is neutral
and generally applicable-such conclusions will likely affect a range of future cases
and claimants and may even give governments an incentive to more vigorously
pursue certain interests and regulations that burden religion. On the other hand, the
question whether a particular claimant's religious exercise was burdened will often
be quite dependent on the claimant-specific facts of the particular case, and the
implications may not extend much further than that particular claimant.335
Few prospects would be as hurtful to religious liberty as the specter of courts
becoming the arbiters of religious doctrinal disagreements. But the threshold test
does not invite judges to assume such a role. Enforcing the threshold test will rarely
require courts to decide whether one belief or another is a more accurate
understanding of a particular faith or creed, because the point that matters in the
threshold inquiry is not whether the creed instructed the claimant to disobey the
law, but whether the claimant's understanding of the creed instructed the claimant
to disobey the law. Courts will inquire, not into a creed, but into the claimant's
understanding of a creed. This is an understandable and necessary line to draw.
335 But see Lupu, supra note 5, at 956 (arguing that while threshold determinations regarding
sincerity will "rarely have any precedential effect for other free exercise claims," determinations
"about what is not religion, like those about what is not a legally cognizable burden on religion,
can operate systematically over time to eliminate entire classes of claims").
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Requiring judges to draw such fine lines is not asking the impossible. Lower
courts seem to have been able to walk this tightrope with some success. Hence a
federal district court, in denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment, was
able to apply the threshold test while rejecting the invitation to inquire into whether
a particular practice was "mandatory" for the claimant's religion.336 Viewing the
disputed facts in the claimant's favor, the court found that the claimant had suffi-
ciently shown that reading certain materials was, for him, a religious practice, and
that the defendant's confiscation of those materials had substantially burdened the
practice of his religion. 37
Similarly, the Second Circuit refused to decide whether attending a particular
feast was "mandated" by a claimant's religious beliefs but still applied the substantial
burden test, opining that "[t]he substantial burden test.., presupposes that there will
be cases in which it comfortably could be said that a belief or practice is so peripheral
to the plaintiff s religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally
de minimis. '3 1 In applying the test to a Muslim claimant who asserted that the state
had kept him from attending the feast, the court also rejected the defendant's argument
that the feast at issue was not important to the practice of Islam; testimony from
Islamic religious authorities was irrelevant in light of the claimant's testimony as to
his own understanding of Islam.3 The court refused to grant his motion for summary
judgment, however, because it found there was a remaining factual dispute as to
whether he had actually taken part in the feast at a different time.' If he had, the
court suggested, then there could be no burden on his free exercise rights, since he
would have been able to do as his religion taught without penalty. 34
As another example, the Seventh Circuit granted a motion for summary judg-
ment against a free exercise claimant who had not demonstrated a sufficient
burden.342 The court found that even assuming the sincerity and religious motiva-
tion of a claimant who demanded pork-free meals, the unavailability of such meals
on three out of 810 occasions was no more than a de minimis burden on his reli-
gious beliefs and practices.343
The Third Circuit has declined to require claimants to show that their burden
was "substantial," 3' at least in the context of the free exercise claims of prisoners,
336 Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1113-14 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
337 Id. at 1114.
338 Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593 (2d Cir. 2003).
139 Id. at 588-91.
340 Id. at 594.
341 See id.
342 Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999).
3 Id.
34 See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding "no support" for
assertion that claimant must establish that challenged policy "substantially burdens" claimant's
religious beliefs).
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but that court still applies the threshold test to free exercise claims. The court
seems to have a good understanding of the principles underlying the threshold test:
The mere assertion of a religious belief does not automatically
trigger First Amendment protections .... To the contrary, only
those beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature
are entitled to constitutional protection.... Thus, if a [claimant's
practice or request] is not the result of sincerely held religious
beliefs, the First Amendment imposes no obligation on the [govern-
ment] to honor that request, and there is no occasion to conduct
the Turner inquiry [into governmental interests]. It is in this way
that [governments] are protected from random requests ... by
[claimants] whose alleged [practices or needs] are not the result of
their religious convictions but rather their secular predilections. 45
Courts do not and should not simply take free exercise claimants at their word
when the claimants assert a burden on the exercise of sincere religious beliefs. It is
both possible and necessary for courts to apply the threshold test without entering
forbidden territory. While it would be dangerous to require too much proof from
claimants in this regard, it is also dangerous to require too little. Courts must continue
to require something more than the claimant's bare assertion, in order to ensure that
they and other government officials are not being duped.
The Supreme Court, as most lower courts have recognized, has never suggested
otherwise. As the Court itself has said: "It is virtually self-evident that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless,
at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to
exercise religious rights. 346
CONCLUSION
Davey need not signal a weakening of free exercise rights. Those rights, already
too slender after Smith, should not be understood to have been further diminished by
Davey. Despite the Court's argument in Davey that Washington's interest in exclud-
ing theology degrees was substantial, the Court does not seem to have wanted this
case to dictate the outcome of challenges to Blaine amendments and similar exclu-
sions of religion within other types of state funding programs. The best and most
plausible reading of Davey, then, is a narrow one that constrains it to its facts: Davey
lost because he could not demonstrate that his insistence on declaring a particular
major in his freshman year was motivated by his sincerely held religious beliefs.
4 DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir. 2000).
3 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985).
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On this understanding, what Davey tells us is that the threshold test for free exer-
cise claims is not going away anytime soon. On the whole, this is good news. This
holding may not change the outcome in a large number of cases that courts actually
hear, but the threshold test provides a sensible tool for discouraging meritless freedom
of religion claims before they even make it into court.
The message, affirmed by numerous Supreme Court precedents and reaffirmed
by the Court in Davey, is simple: before bringing an action claiming the state has
violated your right to freely exercise your religion, make sure the state is making it
more burdensome for you to do something your religion really impels you to do. If
you can follow the teachings of your religion in several alternative ways, only one of
which the state will penalize, you are expected to choose a way that conforms to the
law, rather than insisting on butting heads with the state when your beliefs do not
truly require it. That is not a novel understanding of free exercise rights, and it does
not significantly threaten the religious freedom of the faithful.
